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During the last ten years, the presence of sensors in common life has become pervasive. Sensor
nodes are used in many areas of interest: from military elds to environment monitoring, from
medical applications then to domotic uses. One of the most common radio communication pro-
tocol designed for Personal Area Network (PAN) is described by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard.
Data communication among devices can be protected on a per frame basis, allowing to provide
data authenticity and data condentiality, and congure security mechanisms in a exible and
precise way.
With reference to the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer, the security sublayer was implemented
during this thesis work, providing the main security features the standard describes. In particular,
the TinyOS implementation for the TelosB mote was considered, as well as its CC2420 chipset
features. The main goal of this work is exploit the IEEE 802.15.4 security mechanisms both
sending and receiving ciphered frames, as well as integrate IEEE 802.15.4 security suite with the
security features provided by the CC2420 chipset.
During this work, a simple two nodes network was considered. Besides, ciphering only mode
was used, while all security options and parameters were statically set up. Finally, a simple
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In the last few years, sensors networks phenomenon has grown so much. These systems can be
used for military facilities and war elds monitoring, as well as for environment monitoring and
patients' record collection. Nowadays this technology can be used by anyone, with applications
such as Global Position Systems or trac control, oce monitoring or white goods remote control.
A sensor node (or mote) is a small battery supplied device endowed with a sensing system
able to collect data (temperature, moistness rate, position variations), a processing system which
elaborates information and a communication system which sends and shares data with other
motes.
One of the most important aspects regarding motes is power saving: typically, sensors are
battery powered devices and batteries are not supposed to be changed frequently; thus, it is very
important to increase sensors lifetime with smart techniques, like powering o the communication
system when they do not transmit data or when they are not supposed to receive any.
Another interesting thing regarding motes concerns data transfer: since they have not much
computational resources, data are sent via one or more hops to a Network Coordinator, which in
turn can send them to a host able to cope with data processing and results storage. Communica-
tion between nodes must be reliable, in order to guarantee that frames are received uncorrupted
and avoid retransmissions, saving battery power as well. Besides, it could be necessary or desirable
to make communications safe and secure, that is guarantee messages provenance (authenticity),
protect data from unauthorized accesses (condentiality) and prevent unwanted replies of re-
ceived messages (anti-replay). By doing so, it is more dicult for an adversary to alter or have
access to data communications.
7
One technology suitable for sensors networks is described by the IEEE 802.15.4 Standard:
it describes wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical (PHY) layers specications
for Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (LR-WPANs). Two dierent device types can
participate in an IEEE 802.15.4 network: Full-Function Devices (FFD) and Reduced-Function
Devices (RFD). A network comprises at least one coordinator, that is a FFD capable of relaying
messages from other devices. Plus, one coordinator is elected as the PAN Coordinator. An RFD is
intended for extremely simple applications, such as light switching or passive infrared sensoring.
Consequently, it can be implemented using minimal resources and memory capacity. In addition,
an RFD is associated to a single PAN coordinator at a time.
Depending on the application requirements, a network may be organized in either of two
topologies: the star topology in which all motes communicate directly and only with the network
coordinator, or the peer-to-peer topology where all motes can communicate with each other
within their radio range. Trasmissions are organized into frames, which have been designed
trying to keep complexity at a minimum, while still assuring robustness for transmissions on a
noisy channel.
The medium access exploits the Carrier Sense Multiple Access protocol, with Collision Avoid-
ance. It can be used in an un-slotted version or in a time-slotted version with beacon frames to
keep motes synchronized. In time-slotted version, between every two beacons each device com-
petes with others by means of a slotted CSMA-CA mechanism during the Contention Access
Period (CAP), while guaranteed time slots can be assigned during the Contention Free Period
(CFP).
Moreover, IEEE 802.15.4 oers many security options: encryption only mode (CTR), au-
thentication only mode (CBC-MAC) and a combination of them (CCM). Cryptography is based
on AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) 128 bits symmetric-key cryptography and keys are
provided by the higher layers. Security is handled by means of specic structures (containing
security parameters) and the Auxiliary Security Header used to validate and decipher messages
on reception.
In this thesis work, TelosB motes are used. TelosB is an open source platform designed for
experimentation within the research community. Besides, it includes a CC2420 chipset which
provides extensive hardware support for packet handling and security mechanisms. In particular,
some security routines have been implemented, in order to create and use the Auxiliary Security
Header within IEEE 802.15.4 frames, as provide security services in CTR mode, with reference
to the nesC developing language and the TinyOS environment. Nevertheless, some simplied
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assumptions were made: cryptographic keys and security mode are set in a static way. Finally a
simple application has been realized, in order to test the correctness of communications between
two motes, with or without security.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: next chapter (chapter 2) provides a brief de-
scription about IEEE 802.15.4 networks, while chapter 3 describes the main features of TelosB
motes and CC2420 chipset. Chapter 4 includes a description of the referential network scenario
and discusses the implementation of the Auxiliary Security Header and the security routines as
well. Finally, chapter 5 reports the conclusions.
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Chapter 2
Overview on IEEE 802.15.4
2.1 Basic Concepts
In an IEEE 802.15.4 network, two kinds of device are admitted to participate: full-function de-
vices (FFD) and reduce-function devices (RFD). FFD devices can operate as Personal Area
Network coordinator, as coordinator or as device and they can also talk to RFDs or other FFDs.
RFD devices can communicate only with a single FFD at time and are intended for simple ap-
plications (e.g. light switches). As already told in the previous chapter, two types of network
can be created according to the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, that is star topology and peer to peer
topology(g 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Topology in IEEE 802.15.4
In star topologies the communication is established between devices and a single central con-
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troller, called the PAN coordinator. A device has to associate with the PAN coordinator to be
part of the network. Also in peer-to-peer topologies there is a PAN coordinator, but any device
is allowed to communicate with any other device as long as they are in range of one another.
Peer-to-peer topology allows more complex network formations to be implemented, such as mesh
networking topology. Applications such as industrial control and monitoring, wireless sensor net-
works, asset and inventory tracking, intelligent agriculture, and security would benet from such
a network topology. The physical medium is accessed through a CSMA/CA protocol. Networks
which are not using beaconing mechanisms utilize an unslotted variation which is based on the
listening of the medium, leveraged by a random exponential backo algorithm; acknowledgments
do not adhere to this discipline. Common data transmission utilizes unallocated slots when bea-
coning is in use; again, conrmations do not follow the same process. Conrmation messages may
be optional under certain circumstances, in which case a success assumption is made. Whatever
the case, if a device is unable to process a frame at a given time, it simply does not conrm
its reception: timeout-based retransmission can be performed a number of times, following after
that a decision of whether to abort or keep trying. Because the predicted environment of these
devices demands maximization of battery life, the protocols tend to favor the methods which
lead to it, implementing periodic checks for pending messages, the frequency of which depends
on application needs. IEEE 802.15.4 specify both PHY and MAC layer. The PHY layer activates
and deactivates the radio transceiver, monitors energy detection and link quality indicator for
received packets, controls the clear channel assessment (CCA) for carrier sense multiple access
with collision avoidance (CSMA-CA), selects Channel Frequency and data transmission and re-
ception [1]. The MAC layer allows the transmission of the MAC frames through the use of the
physical channel. Besides the data service, it oers a management interface and manages access
to the physical channel and network beaconing. It also controls frame validation, guarantees time
slots and handles node associations. Finally, it oers hook points for secure services; this topic
will be deepen later.
2.2 Frame Structure
The standard denes four kinds of frame: the four frame structures were designed to keep the
complexity to a minimum as well as making them suciently robust for transmission on a
noisy channel. Each further protocol layer is added to the structure with layer-specic headers
and footers. Beacon frames are transmitted by a coordinator, data frames and acknowledgment
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frames are used for data transfers and to conrm successful frame reception respectively. Finally,
MAC command frames are used to handle all MAC peer entity control transfers.
2.2.1 Beacon Frame
Figure 2.2: Beacon Frame and PHY Packet
The beacon frame (g. 2.2) contains the MAC header (MHR), the MAC Payload and the MAC
footer (MFR). These elds compose the PHY payload and the PHY packet is completed by the
Synchronization Header (SHR) and the PHY header (PHR). The MAC header is composed by 2
octets Frame Counter Field, a single octet Sequence Number Field, a variable length Addressing
Fields and, optionally, the Auxiliary Security Header. The MFR contains a 16-bit frame check
sequence. This frame is used in beacon-enabled network to guarantee synchronization between
RFDs and FFDs.
2.2.2 Data Frame
Figure 2.3: Data Frame and PHY Packet
The data frame content is originated by the upper layers. The MAC payload is prexed with
the MHR and appended with the MFR. The MHR contains the Frame Control Field, the Data
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Sequence Number (DSN), the Addressing Fields, and, optionally, the Auxiliary Security Header.
The MFR is composed of a 16-bit FCS. The MHR, the MAC payload, and the MFR together
form the MAC data frame (g 2.3). These elds compose the PHY payload and the PHY packet
is completed by the Synchronization Header (SHR) and the PHY header (PHR). This frame is
used to exchange data between RFDs and FFDs in star topology networks or between RFDs in
peer-to-peer networks.
2.2.3 Acknowledgment Frame
Figure 2.4: Acknowledgment Frame and PHY Packet
The MAC acknowledgment frame (g. 2.4) is composed by the MHR and the MFR, and it has
no MAC payload. The MHR contains the MAC Frame Control Field and the Sequence Number
(DSN). The MFR is composed of a 16-bit FCS. The MHR and MFR together form the MAC
acknowledgment frame, that is the payload of the PHY packet. The PHY payload is prexed with
the SHR, containing the Preamble Sequence and SFD elds, and the PHR containing the length
of the PHY payload in octets. The SHR, the PHR, and the PHY payload together form the PHY
packet. As we can see in gure, acknowledgment frames do not support the security mechanism;
so they never have the Auxiliary Security Header. This frame, if requested, is sent to the data
sender to notify that the frame it sent, was correctly received. This mechanism is asymmetric:
if a single transmission attempt has failed and the transmission was indirect, the coordinator
shall not retransmit the data or MAC command frame. Instead, the frame shall remain in the
transaction queue of the coordinator and can only be extracted following the reception of a new
data request command. If a new data request command is received, the originating device shall
transmit the frame using the same DSN as was used in the original transmission. Otherwise if a
single transmission attempt has failed and the transmission was direct, the device shall repeat the
process of transmitting the data or MAC command frame and waiting for the acknowledgment,
up to a maximum of macMaxFrameRetries times.
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2.2.4 MAC Command Frame
Figure 2.5: Command Frame and PHY Packet
MAC command frames(g. 2.5) are entirely originated within the MAC sublayer. The MAC
payload contains the Command Type eld and the command payload, which is prexed with
the MHR and appended with the MFR. The MHR contains the MAC Frame Control eld, the
DSN, the Addressing Fields, and, optionally, the Auxiliary Security Header. The MFR contains
a 16-bit FCS. The MHR, the MAC payload, and the MFR together form the MAC command
frame and compose the PHY payload. The PHY payload is prexed with an SHR, containing
the Preamble Sequence and SFD elds, and a PHR containing the length of the PHY payload
in octets. The preamble sequence allows the receiver to achieve symbol synchronization.
2.3 MAC Header and Auxiliary Security Header
Figure 2.6: MAC Frame
The MAC frame is composed of the MAC header, the MAC payload, and the MAC Footer.
However, some elds like Addressing Fieds or Security Header might not be included in all frames,
as shown in gure 2.6
14
2.3.1 Frame Control Field
Figure 2.7: Frame Control Field
The Frame Control Field is 2 octets eld, containing information dening the frame type,
addressing elds type, and other control ags. It is formatted as illustrated in gure 2.7.
2.3.1.1 Frame Type Subeld
The Frame Type subeld species the current frame type (command, beacon, acknowledgment
or data).
2.3.1.2 Security Enabled Subeld
The Security Enabled subeld is set to one if the frame is protected by the MAC security sublayer
and must be set to zero otherwise. This is an important bit, since the Auxiliary Security Header
eld of the MHR is present only if this subeld is set to one.
2.3.1.3 Frame Pending Subeld
The Frame Pending subeld is set to one if the device sending the frame has more data for the
recipient.
2.3.1.4 Acknowledgment Subeld
The Acknowledgment Request subeld is 1 bit in length and species whether or not an acknowl-
edgment is required from the recipient device, on receipt of a data or MAC command frame. If
this subeld is set to one, the recipient device sends an acknowledgment frame only if, upon
reception, the frame passes the third level of ltering. If this subeld is set to zero, the recipient
device will never send acknowledgment frames.
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2.3.1.5 PAN ID Compression subeld
The PAN ID Compression subeld species whether the MAC frame to be sent contains only
one of the PAN identier elds when both source and destination addresses are present. If this
subeld is set to one and both the source and destination addresses are present, the frame has
to contain only the Destination PAN Identier eld, and the Source PAN Identier eld is be
assumed equal to the destination's.
2.3.1.6 Frame Version Subeld
The Frame Version subeld species the version number corresponding to the frame.
2.3.1.7 Addressing Mode Subelds
Finally, the Destination Addressing Mode and the Source Addressing Mode subelds indicate if
Address elds contain 16-bit short addresses or 64-bit extended addresses.
2.3.2 Other MAC Header elds
2.3.2.1 Sequence Number
The Sequence Number eld species the sequence identier for the frame: for a Beacon frame, the
Sequence Number eld has to specify a Beacon Sequence Number. For Data, Acknowledgment,
or MAC Command frame, the Sequence Number eld has to specify a Data Sequence Number,
used to match an acknowledgment frame to the data or MAC command frame.
2.3.2.2 Addressing elds
The addressing elds, if present, specify source and destination address and source and destina-
tion PAN ID, according with the PAN ID compression bit and destination and source addressing
mode in the Frame Control Field.
2.3.3 Auxiliary Security Header
The Auxiliary Security Header has a variable length and contains information required for se-
curity processing, including the Security Control eld, the Frame Counter eld, and the Key
Identier eld. The Auxiliary Security Header is present only if the Security Enabled subeld of
the Frame Control eld is set to one and is formatted as illustrated in gure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Auxiliary Security Header
2.3.3.1 Security Control Field
Figure 2.9: Security Control Subeld
The 8-bit Security Control eld is used to provide information about what kind of protection
is applied to the frame. The Security Control eld has to be formatted as shown in gure 2.9.
The Security Level subeld is 3 bit in length and indicates the actual frame protection that is
provided. This value can be adapted on a frame-by-frame basis and allows for varying levels
of data authenticity (to allow minimization of security overhead in transmitted frames where
required) and for optional data condentiality. Table 2.1 summarizes all security levels available.
Security Level Security Control Security Data Data
Identier Field Attributes condentially authenticity
0x00 '000' None OFF NO (M = 0)
0x01 '001' MIC-32 OFF YES (M = 4)
0x02 '010' MIC-64 OFF YES (M = 8)
0x03 '011' MIC-128 OFF YES (M = 16)
0x04 '100' ENC ON NO (M =0)
0x05 '011' ENC-MIC-32 ON YES (M = 4)
0x06 '110' ENC-MIC-64 ON YES (M = 8)
0x07 '111' ENC-MIC-128 ON YES (M = 16)
Table 2.1: Security Level values and options
The Key Identier Mode subeld is 2 bit in length and indicates whether the key used to protect
the frame can be derived implicitly or explicitly. Furthermore, it is used to indicate the particular
representations of the Key Identier eld, in case the key is derived explicitly. The Key Identier
Mode subeld is set according to Table 2.2. The Key Identier eld of the Auxiliary Security
Header is present only if this subeld has a value not equal to 0x00.
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Key Identier Key Identier Description Key Identier
mode Mode subeld eld length
(octets)
0x00 '00' Key is determined implicitly from the 0
originator and receipient(s) of the frame
as indicated in the frame header.
0x01 '01' Key is determined from the 1-octet Key 1
Index subeld of the Key Identier eld
of the auxiliary security header in 6
conjunction with macDefaultKeySource.
0x02 '10' Key is determined explicitly from the 5
4-octet Key Source subeld and the
1-octet Key Index subeld of the Key
Identier eld of the auxiliary security
header.
0x03 '11' Key is determined explicitly from the 9
8-octet Key Source subeld and the
1-octet Key Index subeld of the Key
Identier eld of the auxiliary security
header.
Table 2.2: Key Identier values and options
2.3.3.2 Frame Counter Field
The Frame Counter eld is 4 octets length eld and represents the macFrameCounter attribute
of the originator of a protected frame. It is used to provide semantic security of the cryptographic
mechanism used to protect a frame and to assure replay protection.
2.3.3.3 Key Identier Field
The Key Identier eld has variable length and identies used for cryptographic protection of
outgoing frames, either explicitly or in conjunction with implicitly dened side information. The
Key Identier eld is present only if the Key Identier Mode subeld of the Security Control
eld of the Auxiliary Security Header is set to a value dierent from 0x00. The Key Identier
eld is formatted as illustrated in gure 2.10. The Key Source subeld, when present, is either 4
octets or 8 octets in length, according to the value specied by the Key Identier Mode subeld
of the Security Control eld, and indicates the originator of a group key. The Key Index subeld
is 1 octet in length and allows unique identication of dierent keys with the same originator.
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Figure 2.10: Key Identier Subeld
2.4 Security Structures
The MAC sublayer is responsible for providing security services on specied incoming and out-
going frames, when requested by the higher layers. The information according to which is de-
termined how to provide security is located in the security-related PIB (PAN Information Base)
[2]. This security-related PIB is divided in 7 structures:
 Key Table.
 Device Table.
 Minimum security level table.
 Frame counter.
 Automatic request attributes.
 Default key source.
 PAN coordinator address.
Key table contains key-descriptors, that they are keys with related key-specic information that
are required for security processing. The device table holds device-descriptors, containing device-
specic addressing and security-related information which, combined with key-specic informa-
tion from the key table, provide all the keying material needed to secure/unsecure frames. The
minimum security level table holds information regarding the minimum security level the device
expects to have been applied by the originator of a frame, depending on frame type and, if it
concerns a MAC command frame, the command frame identier. The 4-octets frame counter is
used to provide replay protection and semantic security of the cryptographic building block used
for securing outgoing frames. The Automatic Request table holds all the information needed
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to secure outgoing frames generated automatically and not as a result of a higher layer prim-
itive, as is the case with automatic data requests. The default key source is commonly shared
between originator and recipient (s) of a secured frame, so that, when combined with additional
information explicitly contained in the requesting primitive or in the received frame, it allows
an originator or a recipient to determine the key required for securing or unsecuring the frame,
respectively. The address of the PAN coordinator is an information commonly shared between
all devices in a PAN. All the security-related PIB attribute and their options are summarize in
Table 2.3. Finally their implementation in the code can be seen in Appendix B.
2.5 Counter with CBC-MAC extension (CCM)
CCM is a generic authenticate-and-encrypt block cipher mode. CCM is only dened for use with
128-bit block ciphers, such as AES: the Advanced Encryption Standard. The AES ciphers have
been analyzed extensively and are now used worldwide, as was the case with its predecessor, the
Data Encryption Standard (DES). AES is based on a design principle known as a Substitution
permutation network. It is fast in both software and hardware, Unlike its predecessor, DES, AES
does not use a Feistel network [3]. The cipher operates on a 4  4 array of bytes, termed the
state (versions of Rijndael with a larger block size have additional columns in the state). Most
AES calculations are done in a special nite eld. The AES cipher is specied as a number of
repetitions of transformation rounds that convert the input plaintext into the nal output of
ciphertext. Each round consists of several processing steps, including one that depends on the
encryption key. A set of reverse rounds are applied to transform ciphertext back into the orig-
inal plaintext using the same encryption key. For Example, an eXtended Sparse Linearization
attack, (XLS) relies on rst analyzing the internals of a cipher and deriving a system of quadratic
simultaneous equations. These systems of equations are typically very large, for example 8000
equations with 1600 variables for the 128-bit AES: it requiring 2100 operations (compared to 2128
possible keys) would be considered a break. For the generic CCM mode there are two parameter
choices. The rst choice is M, the size of the authentication eld. The choice of the value for M
involves a trade-o between message expansion and the probability that an attacker can unde-
tectably modify a message. The second choice is L, the size of the length eld. This value requires
a trade-o between the maximum message size and the size of the Nonce. Dierent applications
require dierent trade-os, so L is a parameter. Regarding the strength of CCM. It is tested that
shows that CCM provides a level of condentiality and authenticity that is in line with other
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Attribute Identier Type Range Description Default
macKeyTable 0x71 List of Key  A table of KeyDescriptor (empty)
Descriptor entries, each contains
entries. keys and related
information required for
secured communications.
macKeyTable- 0x72 Integer Implementa- The number of entries in 0
Entries tion specic macKeyTable.
macDeviceTable 0x73 List of  A table of Device- (empty)
Device- Descriptor entries, each
Descriptor indicating a remote device
entries with which this device
securely communicates.
macDeviceTable- 0x74 Integer Implementa- The number of entries in 0
entries tion specic macDeviceTable.
macSecurity- 0x75 Table of  A table of SecurityLevel- (empty)
LevelTable SecurityLevel Descriptor entries, each
Descriptor with information about
entries minimum security level
expected depending on
incoming frame type and
subtype.
macSecurity- 0x76 Integer Implementa- The number of entries in 0
LevelTableEntries tion specic macSecurityLevelTable
macFrameCounter 0x77 Integer 0x00000000- The outgoing frame 0x00
0x counter for this device.
macAutoRequest- 0x78 Integer 0x00-0x07 The security level used for 0x06
SecurityLevel automatic data request.
macAutoRequest- 0x79 Integer 0x00-0x03 The key identier mode 0x00
KeyIdMode used for automatic data
request. This Attribute is
invaild if the macAuto-
RequestSecurityLevel
attribute is set to 0x00.
macAutoRequest- 0x7a As specied  The originator of the key All octets
KeySource by the mac- used for automatic data 0x
AutoRequest- request.
KeyIDMode.
macAutoRequest- 0x7b Integer 0x01-0x The index of the key used All octets
KeyIndex for automatic data request. 0x
macDefaultKey- 0x7c Set of 8 octets  The originator of the All octets
Source default key used for key 0x
identier mode 0x01.
macPANCoord- 0x7d IEEE address An extended 64-bit address of the 
ExtendedAddress 64-bit IEEE PAN coordinator.
address
MacPANCoord- 0x7e Integer 0x0000-0x 16-bit address of the 0x0000
ShortAddress PAN coordinator.
0xfe means that PAN
coordinator uses only 64-bit
extended address.
Table 2.3: MAC security-related PIB
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proposed authenticated encryption modes, such as OCB mode. The only weakness of CCM is
the trade-o between nonce size and counter size. For a general mode we want to support large
messages. Some applications use only small messages, but would rather have a larger nonce.
Introducing the L parameter solves this issue. The parameter M gives the traditional trade-o
between message expansion and probability of forgery. For most applications, it is choosing M
at least 8. Performance depends on the speed of the block cipher implementation.
In hardware, for large packets, the speed achievable for CCM is roughly the same as that achiev-
able with the CBC encryption mode. Encrypting and authenticating an empty message, with-
out any additional authentication data, requires two block cipher encryption operations. For
each block of additional authentication data one additional block cipher encryption operation
is required (if one includes the length encoding). Each message block requires two block cipher
encryption operations. The worst-case situation is when both the message and the additional
authentication data are a single octet. In this case, CCM requires ve block cipher encryption
operations. CCM results in the minimal possible message expansion; the only bit added are the
authentication bit. Both the CCM encryption and CCM decryption operations require only the
block cipher encryption function. In AES, the encryption and decryption algorithms have some
signicant dierences. Thus, using only the encrypt operation can lead to a signicant savings
in code size or hardware size In hardware, CCM can compute the message authentication code
and perform encryption in a single pass. That is, the implementation does not have to complete
calculation of the message authentication code before encryption can begin. CCM was designed
for use in the packet processing environment. The authentication processing requires the message
length to be known at the beginning of the operation, which makes one-pass processing dicult






A sensor node, also known as a 'mote' , is a node in a wireless sensor network that is capable
of performing some processing, gathering sensory information and communicating with other
connected nodes in the network. As we saw in gure 3.1, one point of strength about motes is
their small dimension.
Figure 3.1: A simple mote
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Figure 3.2: Components of a Mote
In the gure 3.2, we can see the components of the mote: an antenna, that permits to send and
receive data; a microcontroller that performs tasks, processes data and controls the functionality
of other components in the sensor node; 3 leds that can be use to signal certain situation or for






 Power management subsystem.
The sensing subsystem is designed to gather information about the environment. It will process
and store information that other subsystem use. The data collection system would capture data
such as reected light and sound. The processing subsystem is designated to take the information
from e.g. the sensing subsystem and elaborate them in the way they can be used by other sub-
systems. The communication subsystem is designated for sending and receiving tasks. The power
management subsystem concerns about all the operations about battery managing (e.g. power
saving) and nally the actuation subsystem gathers information from sensing and processing and
decide how to control and evolve the system. The mote we work with is TelosB: it is an open
source platform designed to enable cutting-edge experimentation for the research community.
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Figure 3.3: Generic Architecture
The TPR2400 bundles all the essentials for lab studies into a single platform including: USB
programming capability, an IEEE 802.15.4 radio with integrated antenna, a low-power MCU
with extended memory and an optional sensor suite (TPR2420).
Figure 3.4: TPR2400CA Block Diagram
This suite oers many features, including:
 IEEE 802.15.4/ZigBee compliant RF transceiver
 Integrated onboard antenna
 Low current consumption
 1 MB external ash for data logging
 Programming and data collection via USB
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 Runs TinyOS 1.1.10 or higher
This platform delivers low power consumption allowing for long battery life as well as fast wakeup
from sleep state. Though the TPR2400 is an uncertied radio platform, it is fully compatible
with the open-source TinyOS distribution. TPR2400 is powered by two AA batteries. If the
TPR2400 is plugged into the USB port for programming or communication, power is provided
from the host computer. If the TPR2400 is always attached to the USB port no battery pack
is needed. TPR2400 provides users with the capability to interface with additional devices. The
two expansion connectors and onboard jumpers may be congured to control analog sensors,
digital peripherals and LCD displays [5]. The platform with we work is TinyOS versione 2.0.2:
it is a small, open-source, energy-ecient software operating system developed by UC Berkeley
which supports large scale, selfconguring sensor networks. Other information can be found at
TinyOS main site www.tinyos.org.
3.2 CC2420 Chipset
CC240 is the chipset that TelosB motes used. It can be used in several applications: Zigbee and
TinyOS systems, home and building automation, industrial control and wireless sensor networks.
The CC2420 is a true single-chip 2.4 GHz IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver designed
for low-power and low-voltage wireless applications. It provides extensive hardware support for
packet handling, data buering, burst transmissions, data encryption, data authentication, clear
channel assessment, link quality indication and packet timing information. Between its many
features, we can highlight the separate transmit and receive FIFOs, the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC
hardware support (CRC-16 computation, Energy Detection, Link Quality detection, etc.) and
IEEE 802.15.4 MAC hardware security (CTR encryption/decryption, CBC-MAC authentication
CCM encryption /decryption and authentication, stand-alone AES encryption).
3.2.1 Conguration and Data Interface
There are 33 16-bit conguration and status registers, 15 command strobe registers, and two
8-bit registers to access to the separate transmit and receive FIFOs. Each of the 50 registers is
addressed by a 6-bit address. The conguration registers can be read by the microcontroller via
the same conguration interface. The R/W bit must be set high to initiate the data read-back.
CC2420 then returns the data from the addressed register on the 16 clock cycles following the
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register address. During transfer of the register access byte or command strobes, the rst RAM
address byte and data transfer to the TXFIFO, the CC2420 status byte is returned on the SO
pin. The status byte contains 6 status bit which are described in Table 3.1. Issuing a SNOP (no
operation) command strobe may be used to read the status byte.
Command strobes may be viewed as single byte instruction to CC2420.
Bit# Name Description
7  Reserved, ignore value
6 XOSC16M_STABLE Indicates whether the 16 MHz oscillator is running or not
0 : The 16 MHz crystal oscillator is not running
1 : The 16 MHz crystal oscillator is running
5 TX_UNDERFLOW Indicates whether a FIFO underow has occurred during
transmission. It must be cleared manually with a SFLUSHTX
command strobe.
0 : No underow has occurred
1 : An underow has occurred
4 ENC_BUSY Indicates whether the encryption module is busy
0 : Encryption module is idle
1 : Encryption module is busy
3 TX_ACTIVE Indicates whether RF transmission is active
0 : RF Transmission is idle
1 : RF Transmission is active
2 LOCK Indicates whether the frequency synthesizer PLL is in lock or not
0 : The PLL is out of lock
1 : The PLL is in lock
1 RSSI_VALID Indicates whether the RSSI value is valid or not.
0 : The RSSI value is not valid
1 : The RSSI value is valid, always true when reception has been
enabled at least 8 symbol periods (128 us)
0  Reserved, ignore value
Table 3.1: Status Byte
By addressing a command strobe register internal sequences will be started.
These commands must be used to enable receive mode, start decryption etc. All command strobe
can be viewed in Table 3.2.
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Address Register Description
0x00 SNOP No Operation (has no other eect than reading out status-bits)
0x01 SXOSCON Turn on the crystal oscillator (set XOSC16M_PD = 0 and
BIAS_PD = 0)
0x02 STXCAL Enable and calibrate frequency synthesizer for TX;
Go from RX / TX to a wait state where only the synthesizer is
running.
0x03 SRXON Enable RX
0x04 STXON Enable TX after calibration (if not already performed)
Start TX in-line encryption if SPI_SEC_MODE 6= 0
0x05 STXONCCA If CCA indicates a clear channel:
Enable calibration, then TX.
Start in-line encryption if SPI_SEC_MODE 6= 0
else
do nothing
0x06 SRFOFF Disable RX/TX and frequency synthesizer
0x07 SXOSCOFF Turn o the crystal oscillator and RF
0x08 SFLUSHRX Flush the RX FIFO buer and reset the demodulator. Always
read at least one byte from the RXFIFO before issuing the
SFLUSHRX command strobe
0x09 SFLUSHRX Flush the TX FIFO buer
0x0A SACK Send acknowledge frame, with pending eld cleared.
0x0B SACKPEND Send acknowledge frame, with pending eld set.
0x0C SRXDEC Start RXFIFO in-line decryption / authentication (as set by
SPI_SEC_MODE)
0x0D STXENC Start TXFIFO in-line encryption / authentication (as set by
SPI_SEC_MODE), without starting TX.
0x0E SAES AES Stand alone encryption strobe. SPI_SEC_MODE is not
required to be 0, but the encryption module must be idle. If not,
the strobe is ignored.
Table 3.2: Strobe conguration registers overview
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3.2.2 RAM access
CC240 also has 368 bytes RAM that can be accessed through the SPI interface. It contains 1-1
mapping of the FIFO registers, the KEY0 and the KEY1 registers, the RXNONCE and the
TXNONCE registers. In Table 3.3 we can see a little summarization of RAM. The TXFIFO is
write only, but it may be read back using RAM access. Data is read and written one byte at a
time, as with RAM access. The RXFIFO is both writeable and readable. The KEY0 and KEY1
registers contain a 16-bit key used for ciphering/deciphering operation. After a key is written in
any of these registers, it is selected and used reading the SEC_TXKEYSEL/SEC_RXKEYSEL
bit in SECCTRL0 register. TXNONCE and RXNONCE contain nonce for authentication.
Addressing Name Description
0x16F   Not used
0x16C
0x16B  SHORTADR 16-bit Short address, used for address recognition.
0x16A
0x169 PANID 16-bit PAN identier, used for address recognition.
0X168
0x167  IEEEADR 64-bit IEEE address of current node, used for address
0x160 recognition .
0x15F  CBSTATE Temporary storage for CBC-MAC calculations.
0x150
0x14F  TXNONCE / TXCTR Transmitter nonce for in-line authentication and
0x140 transmitter counter for in-line encryption.
0x13F  KEY1 Encryption Key 1.
0x130
0x12F  SABUF Stand-alone encryption buer, for plaintext input and
0x120 ciphertext output.
0x11F  RXNONCE / RXCTR Receiver nonce for in-line authentication or
0x110 receiver counter for in-line decryption.
0x10F  KEY 0 Encrypted Key 0.
0x100
0x0FF  RXFIFO 128 bytes receive FIFO.
0x80
0x07F  TXFIFO 128 bytes transmit FIFO.
0x00
Table 3.3: RAM Memory Space
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3.2.3 Security Operation
CC2420 features hardware IEEE 802.15.4 MAC security operations. This includes counter mode
(CTR) encryption/decryption, CBC-MAC authentication and CCM encryption and authentica-
tion. All security operations are based on AES encryption using 128 bit keys. Security operations
are performed within the transmit and receive FIFOs on a frame basis. The SAES, STXENC and
SRXDEC command strobes are used to start security operations in CC2420 as will be described
in the following sections. The ENC_BUSY status bit may be used to monitor when a security
operation has been completed. Security command strobes issued while the security engine is busy,
will be ignored and the ongoing operation will be completed. The CC2420 RAM space has storage
space for two individual keys (KEY0 and KEY1). Transmit, receive and stand-alone encryption
may select one of these two keys individually in the SEC_TXKEYSEL, SEC_RXKEYSEL and
SEC_SAKEYSEL control bits (SECCTRL0). A way of establishing the keys used for encryption
and authentication must be decided for each particular application. IEEE 802.15.4 does not de-
ne how this is done, it is left to the higher layers of the protocol. The nonce must be correctly
initialized before receiving or transmitting operation. The format of the nonce is shown in gure
3.5. The block counter must be set to 1. The key sequence counter is controlled by a layer above
the MAC layer. The frame counter must be increased for each new frame by the MAC layer. The
source address is the 64 bit IEEE address.
Figure 3.5: IEEE 802.15.4 Nonce
The other registers used on security operation are SECCTRL0(Table 3.4) and SECCNTRL1(Table
3.5): SECCTRL0 contains all security options(which key is used, what type of security it is ap-
plied to frame, other options); SECCNTRL1 contains the oset where encryption/decryption/au-
thentication starts.
The key, nonce (does not apply to CBC-MAC), SECCTRL0 and SECCTRL1 control registers
must be correctly set before starting any in-line security operation.
The in-line security mode is set in SECCTRL0.SEC_MODE to one of the following modes:
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Bit Field Name Reset Description
15:10  0 Reserved, write as 0
9 RXFIFO_PROTECTION 1 Protection enable of the RXFIFO (overow)
8 SEC_CBC_HEAD 1 Denes what to use for the rst byte in CBC-MAC
( does not apply to CBC-MAC part of CCM):
0 : Use the rst data byte as the rst byte into CBC-MAC
1: : Use the length of the data to be authenticated for tx
or using SEC_RXL
7 SEC_SAKEYSEL 1 Stand Alone Key select
0 : Key 0 is used - 1 : Key 1 is used
6 SEC_TXKEYSEL 1 TX Key select
0 : Key 0 is used - 1 : Key 1 is used
5 SEC_RXKEYSEL 1 RX Key select
0 : Key 0 is used - 1 : Key 1 is used
4:2 SEC_M[2:0] 1 Number of bytes in authentication eld for CBC-MAC,
bytes encoded as (M-2)/2.
0 : Reserved  1: 4  2: 6  3: 8
4:10  5: 12  6:14  7: 16
1:0 SEC_MODE[1:0] 0 Security mode




Table 3.4: Security Control0 Register
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Bit Field Name Reset Description
15  0 Reserved, write as 0
14:8 SEC_TXL 0 Multi-purpose length byte for TX in-line security operations:
CTR : Number of cleartext bytes between length byte and the
rst byte to be encrypted
CBC-MAC : Number of cleartext bytes between length byte and
the rst byte to be authenticated
CCM : l(a), dening the number of bytes to be authenticated but
not encrypted
Stand-alone : SEC_TXL has no eect
7  0 Reserved, write as 0
6:0 SEC_RXL 0 Multi-purpose length byte for TX in-line security operations:
CTR : Number of cleartext bytes between length byte and the
rst byte to be deencrypted
CBC-MAC : Number of cleartext bytes between length byte and
the rst byte to be authenticated
CCM : l(a), dening the number of bytes to be authenticated but
not decrypted
Stand-alone : SEC_RXL has no eect
Table 3.5: Security Control1 Register
 Disabled
 CBC-MAC (authentication)
 CTR (encryption / decryption )
 CCM (authentication and encryption/decryption)
When enabled, TX in-line security is started in one of two ways: issuing the STXENC command
strobe, so in-line security will be performed within the TXFIFO, but a RF transmission will not
be started. Ciphertext may be read back using RAM read operations; or issuing the STXON
or STXONCCA command strobe, so in-line security will be performed within the TXFIFO and
a RF transmission of the ciphertext is started. When enabled, RX in-line security is started as
follows: issuing a SRXDEC command strobe, so the rst frame in the RXFIFO is then decrypt-
ed/authenticated as set by the current security mode. RX in-line security operations are always
performed on the rst frame currently inside the RXFIFO, even if parts of this has already been
read out over the SPI interface. This allows the receiver to rst read the source address out to
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decide which key to use before doing authentication of the complete frame. In CTR or CCM
mode it is of course important that bytes to be decrypted are not read out before the security
operation is started. The frame in the RXFIFO may be received over RF or it may be written
into the RXFIFO over the SPI interface for debugging or higher layer security operations.
3.2.3.1 CTR mode encryption / decryption
CTR mode encryption/decryption is performed by CC2420 on MAC frames within the TXFI-
FO/RXFIFO respectively. SECCTRL1.SEC_TXL/SEC_RXL sets the number of bytes between
the length eld and the rst byte to be encrypted/decrypted respectively. This controls the num-
ber of plaintext bytes in the current frame. When encryption is initiated, the plaintext in the
TXFIFO is then encrypted. The encryption module will encrypt all the plaintext currently avail-
able and it will wait if not everything is prebuered. The encryption operation may also be
started without any data in the TXFIFO at all, and data will be encrypted as it is written to
the TXFIFO. When decryption is initiated with the SRXDEC command strobe, the ciphertext
of the RXFIFO is then decrypted.
3.2.3.2 CBC-MAC
CBC-MAC in-line authentication is provided by CC2420 hardware. SECCTRL0.SEC_M sets
the MIC length M, encoded as (M-2)/2. When enabling CBC-MAC in-line TXFIFO authentica-
tion, the generated MIC is written to the TXFIFO for transmission. The frame length must in-
clude the MIC. SECCTRL1.SEC_TXL/SEC_RXL sets the number of bytes between the length
eld and the rst byte to be authenticated, normally set to 0 for MAC authentication. SECC-
TRL0.SEC_CBC_HEAD denes if the authentication length is used as the rst byte of data to
be authenticated or not. This bit should be set to 1. When enabling CBC-MAC in-line RXFIFO
authentication, the generated MIC is compared to the MIC in the RXFIFO. The last byte of the
MIC is replaced in the RXFIFO with: 0x00 if MIC is correct, 0xFF if MIC is incorrect.
3.2.3.3 CCM
CCM combines CTR mode encryption and CBC-MAC authentication in one operation. SECC-
TRL1.SEC_TXL/SEC_RXL sets the number of bytes after the length eld to be authenticated





As we said in the previous chapters, IEEE 802.15.4 oers several way to secure a frame: packets
can be only encrypted, only authenticated or encryption and authenticated. In our scenario,we
consider two motes: a RFD sender that transmits ciphered data and a FFD coordinator that
deciphers messages and sends acks. When security is o, upper layers send to MAC no security
parameters: when the frame is built, security routines are not called and the frame is sent in clear
text. The coordinator, while parsing the frame, understands that it has no security and does not
proceed to unsecure. This exchange can be seen in gure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Frame transfer with no security
When security is on, upper layers send to MAC some security parameters: when the frame is
built, Auxiliary Security Header is inserted in the frame and security routines are called.
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Then security is applied to the frame and send. The coordinator, while parsing the frame, un-
derstands that it is not in clear text and does proceed to unsecure . This exchange can be seen
in gure 4.2. Security parameters, from now we can refer to these as Security Structure, must
Figure 4.2: Frame transfer with security
contain the values in Table 4.1.
Name Type Range Description
SecurityLevel Integer 0x00  0x07 The security level to be used.(see Table 2.1)
KeyIdMode Integer 0x00  0x03 The mode used to identify the key to be used.
(see Table 2.2)
Key Source Set of 0 As specied by the The originator of the key to be used.
4, or 8 KeyIdMode parameter This parameter is ignored if the KeyIdMode
octets parameter is ignored or set to 0x00.
KeyIndex Integer 0x01  0x The index of the key to be used. This
parameter is ignored if the KeyIdMode
parameter is ignored or set to 0x00.
Table 4.1: Security Structure
This security structure is used by application layer to pass the security parameters when the
frame is created. The implementation of the security structure is the following: 1
1 // tkn154/TKN154. h
2 typedef struct i e e e154_secur i ty {
3 uint8_t Secur i tyLeve l ;
4 uint8_t KeyIdMode ;
5 uint8_t KeySource [ 8 ] ;
1All the code is Copyright (c) 2008, Technische Universitaet Berlin All rights reserved
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6 uint8_t KeyIndex ;
7 } ieee154_secur i ty_t ;
The actual frame protection provided can be adapted on a frame-by-frame basis and allows for
varying levels of data authenticity (to minimize security overhead in transmitted frames where
required) and for optional data condentiality. For this reason all the routines handled by MAC
management entity, called the MLME, has to manage at least one security structure. The MLME
commands can be seen in Table 4.2. We will focus on the MCPS-DATA.request :
Name Description
MLME-ASSOCIATE.request Allows a device to request an association with a coordinator.
MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication Indicates a reception of an association request
command.
MLME-ASSOCIATE.response Initiates a response to a MLME-ASSOCIATE.indication primitive.
MLME-ASSOCIATE.conrm Informs the next higher layer of the initiating device
whether its request to associate was successful or unsuccessful.
MLME-DISASSOCIATE.request Noties the coordinator of its intent to leave the PAN.
MLME-DISASSOCIATE.indication The reception of a disassociation notication command.
MLME-GTS.indication Indicates that a GTS has been allocated or
that a previously allocated GTS has been deallocated.
MLME-ORPHAN.indication Allows the MLME of a coordinator to notify
the next higher layer of the presence of an orphaned device.
MLME-ORPHAN.response Allows the next higher layer of a coordinator
to respond to the MLME-ORPHAN.indication primitive.
MLME-SCAN.request Is used to initiate a channel scan over a given list of channels.
MLME-COMM-STATUS.indication Allows the MLME to indicate a communications status.
MLME-START.request Allows the PAN coordinator to initiate a new PAN
or to begin using a new superframe conguration.
MLME-SYNC-LOSS.indication Indicates the loss of synchronization with a coordinator.
MLME-POLL.request Prompts the device to request data from the coordinator.
Table 4.2: MLME commands
MAC common part sublayer (MCPS) data.request primitive requests the transfer of a data SPDU
(i.e., MSDU) from a local SSCS (Service-specic convergence sublayer) entity to a single peer
SSCS entity. In the Table 4.3 we can see the semantic of this command:
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Name Type Range Description
SrcAddrMode Integer 0x00  0x03 The source addressing mode for this primitive and
subsequent MPDU.
DstAddrMode Integer 0x00  0x03 The destination addressing mode for this primitive
and subsequent MPDU.
DstPANId Integer 0x0000  0x The 16-bit PAN identier of the entity to which the
MSDU is being transferred.
DstAddr Device As specied by the The individual device address of the entity to which
address DstAddrMode parameter the MSDU is being transferred.
msduLength Integer  aMaxMACPayloadSize The number of octets contained in the MSDU to be
transmitted by the MAC sublayer entity.
msdu Set of  The set of octets of MSDU to be transmitted
octets by the MAC sublayer entity.
msduHandle Integer 0x00  0x The handle associated with the MSDU to be
transmitted by the MAC sublayer entity.
TxOptions Bitmap 3-bit eld The 3 bits (b0, b1, b2) indicate the transmission
options for this MSDU.
SecurityLevel Integer 0x00  0x07 The security level to be used.(see Table 2.1)
KeyIdMode Integer 0x00  0x03 The mode used to identify the key to be used.
(see Table 2.2)
Key Source Set of 0 As specied by the The originator of the key to be used.
4, or 8 KeyIdMode parameter This parameter is ignored if the KeyIdMode
octets parameter is ignored or set to 0x00.
KeyIndex Integer 0x01  0x The index of the key to be used. This
parameter is ignored if the KeyIdMode
parameter is ignored or set to 0x00.
Table 4.3: MCPS-DATA.request primitive
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4.2 Creation of data packets
4.2.1 MAC Header and Data Frame
As we can see in gure 4.3, a data frame contains the MAC Header, the MAC Payload and the
Mac footer.
Figure 4.3: MAC Data Frame
There are two main structures that describe the data packet: the generic message_t structure
and the ieee154_txframe_t.
1 // tos / types /message . h
2 typedef nx_struct message_t {
3 nx_uint8_t header [ s izeof (message_header_t ) ] ;
4 nx_uint8_t data [TOSH_DATA_LENGTH] ;
5 nx_uint8_t f o o t e r [ s izeof ( message_footer_t ) ] ;
6 nx_uint8_t metadata [ s izeof (message_metadata_t ) ] ;
7 } message_t ;
8 // tkn154/TKN154_MAC. h
9 typedef struct
10 {
11 uint8_t c l i e n t ;
12 uint8_t handle ; // The se t of o c t e t s forming the MSDU
13 ieee154_header_t header ; //MAC Heder (MHR)
14 uint8_t headerLen ; // Length of MHR
15 uint8_t payload ; //MAC payload
16 uint8_t payloadLen ; // Length of Payload
17 ieee154_metadata_t metadata ;
18 ieee154_txframe_t ;
The ieee154_txframe_t is a structure used for prepare the frame that will be sent. It contains
the MAC header, the MAC payload and the MAC metadata; the MAC footer is added in a
second time by CC2420 during transmission. Now we see the MAC Header must be and the how
is implemented (g. 4.4):
1 // tkn154/TKN154_MAC. h
2 MHR_MAX_LEN = 37 ; // 23 + 14
3 typedef struct {
4 uint8_t length ;
5 uint8_t mhr [MHR_MAX_LEN] ;
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6 } ieee154_header_t ;
7 typedef struct {
8 uint8_t r s s i ;
9 uint8_t l i nkQua l i t y ;
10 uint32_t timestamp ;
11 } ieee154_metadata_t ;
Figure 4.4: MAC Frame
4.2.2 Auxiliary Security Header
The Auxiliary Security Header eld shall be formatted as illustrated in gure 4.5 and ??.
Figure 4.5: Auxiliary Security Header
This is the implementation of the Auxiliary Security Header:
1 // tkn154/TKN154_MAC. h
2 typedef struct {
3 uint8_t s e cu r i t yCont ro l ;
4 uint32_t frameCounter ;
5 uint8_t keySource [ 8 ] ;
6 uint8_t keyIndex ;
7 } ieee154_security_header_t ;
For setting the dierent subelds of Security Control eld, can be used the macros in the same
le.
1 // tkn154/TKN154_MAC. h
2 SEC_CNTL_LEVEL_POS = 0 , // Posi t ion of Secur i ty Level in Secur i ty Control
3 SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE_POS = 3 , // Posi t ion of KeyIDMode in Secur i ty Control
4 SEC_CNTL_RESERVED_POS = 5 , // Posi t ion of Reserved in Secur i ty Control
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4.2.3 Setting the MAC header
The MAC header is built by two dierent operations: the rst will set all the elds regard-
ing addressing and the security header; the second will set the other elds and prepare the
ieee154_txframe_t packet that will be transfered.
4.2.3.1 setAddressingField function
Now we see the function that sets the addressing elds:
1 // tkn154/PibP . nc
2 command error_t Frame . s e tAddre s s i ngF i e ld s (message_t frame ,
3 uint8_t srcAddrMode ,
4 uint8_t dstAddrMode ,
5 uint16_t dstPANId ,
6 ieee154_address_t dstAddr ,
7 ieee154_secur i ty_t  s e c u r i t y )
8 {
9 uint8_t mhr = MHR( frame ) ;
10 message_t myframe = frame ;
11 ieee154_address_t srcAddress ;
12 ieee154_macPANId_t srcPANId = c a l l MLME_GET.macPANId ( ) ;
13 ieee154_secur i ty_t temp = s e cu r i t y ;
14 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] &= (FC2_DEST_MODE_MASK | FC2_SRC_MODE_MASK) ;
15 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] |= dstAddrMode << FC2_DEST_MODE_OFFSET;
16 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] |= srcAddrMode << FC2_SRC_MODE_OFFSET;
17 i f ( srcAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS)
18 srcAddress . shortAddress = c a l l MLME_GET. macShortAddress ( ) ;
19 else
20 srcAddress . extendedAddress = c a l l GetLocalExtendedAddress . get ( ) ;
21 i f ( dstAddrMode>=ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS &&
22 srcAddrMode>=ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS && dstPANId == srcPANId )
23 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] |= FC1_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION;
24 else
25 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] &= ~FC1_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION;








34 (mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] & FC1_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) ? TRUE: FALSE) ;
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36 i f ( temp && (temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) )
37 {
38 #ifde f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
40
39 i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CTR)
40 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . se tCtr (myframe , 0 , 0 , temp ) ;
41 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CBC_MAC_4)
42 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . setCbcMac ( frame , 0 , 0 ,MICLENGTH4, temp ) ;
43 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CBC_MAC_8)
44 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . setCbcMac ( frame , 0 , 0 ,MICLENGTH8, temp ) ;
45 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CBC_MAC_16)
46 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . setCbcMac ( frame , 0 , 0 ,MICLENGTH16, temp ) ;
47 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CCM_4)
48 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . setCcm( frame , 0 , 0 ,MICLENGTH4, temp ) ;
49 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CCM_8)
50 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . setCcm( frame , 0 , 0 ,MICLENGTH8, temp ) ;
51 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) == CCM_16)
52 c a l l CC2420SecurityMode . setCcm( frame , 0 , 0 ,MICLENGTH16, temp ) ;
53 #else





The function Frame.setAddressingFileds() takes in these parameters:
 @ frame: The frame;
 @ srcAddrMode: The source addressing mode;
 @ dstAddrMode: The destination addressing mode;
 @ dstPANID: The 16 bit PAN identier of the destination;
 @ dstAddr: Individual device address of the destination as per the dstAddrMode;
 @ security: the security options (NULL means security is disabled);
As we saw in the code, after declaration and initialization of local variables (lines 9 - 13), the
subelds of the Frame Control Field regarding addressing are set (line 14 - 25) and then the
addressing elds are written in the MHR by FrameUtility.writeHeader() (see Appendix A). Then,
if the security structure that upper layer passed, is not NULL, the Security Level is not 0x00
and security is enabled (lines 36 - 38), depending of the value of Security Level, it is called a
function that writes the Auxiliary Security Header in the MAC header. The CC2420SecurityMode
interface takes the role of selecting the security mode and adding the security headers in the MAC
Header by dening the commands setCTR(), setCbcMac() and setCcm(). These commands are
also extended with the security structure as a parameter.
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command error_t setCtr() is called when the user wants to encrypt using the counter encryption
mode. The command takes in three parameters as the following.
 uint8_t setKey: This parameter selects one of the two key registers.
 uint8_t setSkip: It is a CC2420 specic parameter that sets the number of bytes to skip
in the payload without the aect of security functions.To be IEEE 802.15.4 compliant, the
value should be set to 0.
 ieee154_security_t *security: Security values.
command error_t setCbcMac() is called when user wants to authenticate using the Cipher Block
Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC-MAC) mode. The command takes in four param-
eters as the following.
 uint8_t setKey: This parameter selects one of the two key registers.
 uint8_t setSkip: It is a CC2420 specic parameter that sets the number of bytes to skip
in the payload without the aect of security functions.To be IEEE 802.15.4 compliant, the
value should be set to 0.
 uint8_t size: This parameter sets the length of the MIC used in the authentication
process. Sizes can be selected from 4, 8, and 16. If a dierent value is selected, the command
returns a FAIL.
 ieee154_security_t *security: Security values.
command error_t setCcm() is called when user wants to encrypt and authenticate using the
Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode. The command takes in four parameters as the following.
 uint8_t setKey: This parameter selects one of the two key registers.
 uint8_t setSkip: It is a CC2420 specic parameter that sets the number of bytes to skip
in the payload without the aect of security functions.To be IEEE 802.15.4 compliant, the
value should be set to 0.
 uint8_t size: This parameter sets the length of the MIC used in the authentication
process. Sizes can be selected from 4, 8, and 16. If a dierent value is selected, the command
returns a FAIL.
 ieee154_security_t *security: Security values.
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4.2.4 Setting the Auxiliary Security Header
Now we see how the Auxiliary Security Header is written in MHR with setCtr():
1 // tkn154/PibP . nc
2 command error_t CC2420SecurityMode . se tCtr (message_t frame , uint8_t setKey ,
3 uint8_t setSkip , i eee154_secur i ty_t  s e c u r i t y )
4 {
5 uint8_t mhr = MHR( frame ) ;
6 i eee154_secur i ty_t mysec = s e cu r i t y ;
7 uint8_t l en = 0 ;
8 uint8_t o f f s e t = 0 ;
9 ieee154_macFrameCounter_t macCounter ;
10 i f ( setKey > 1 | | s e tSk ip > 7){
11 return FAIL ;
12 }
13 i f ( mysec  > Secur i tyLeve l > 7 | | mysec  > KeyIdMode > 4)
14 return FAIL ;
15 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength (mhr [ 0 ] , mhr [ 1 ] , &len ) ;
16 o f f s e t = len ;
17 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] |= FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED;
18 mhr [ o f f s e t ] = (mysec > Secur i tyLeve l << SEC_CNTL_LEVEL_POS) ;
19 mhr [ o f f s e t ] |= se tSk ip << SEC_CNTL_RESERVED_POS;
20 mhr [ o f f s e t++] |= (mysec  >KeyIdMode << SEC_CNTL_KEYDMODE_POS) ;
21 macCounter = c a l l MLME_GET. macFrameCounter ( ) ;
22 i f ( macCounter == 0 x f f f f f f f f )
23 return IEEE154_COUNTER_ERROR;
24  ( ( nx_uint32_t ) (&(mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) ) ) = macCounter ;
25 o f f s e t +=4;
26 c a l l MLME_SET. macFrameCounter(++macCounter ) ;
27 i f ( mysec >KeyIdMode & SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE ) {
28 i f ( ( mysec >KeyIdMode & SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE) == KEYIDMODE1) {
29 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeyIndex ;
30 }
31 else i f ( (mysec >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE) == KEYIDMODE2) {
32 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 0 ] ;
33 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 1 ] ;
34 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 2 ] ;
35 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 3 ] ;
36 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeyIndex ;
37 }
38 else {
39 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 0 ] ;
40 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 1 ] ;
41 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 2 ] ;
42 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 3 ] ;
43 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 4 ] ;
44 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 5 ] ;
45 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 6 ] ;
46 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = mysec >KeySource [ 7 ] ;
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After consistency checks (line 10 - 14), the function FrameUtility.getAddressingFieldsLength()
(see Appendix A) returns the addressing elds length (so the position where Auxiliary Secu-
rity Header starts). Then the Security Enabled Bit in Frame Control Field and Security Con-
trol Field are set (lines 17 and 18-20 respectively), after it is set the macFrameCounter eld
and updated (lines 22-26). Finally depending of the value of KeyID mode, the others eld of
the Auxiliary Security Header are set by the value of the security structure. (lines 27 - 48).
CC2420SecurityMode.setCbcMac(), CC2420SecurityMode.setCCM() and Frame.writeSecurityMHR()
(another function that writes the Auxiliary Security Header in some cases) do the same things
as CC2420SecurityMode.setCtr(). For detailed codes, see the Appendix A.
4.2.4.1 MCPS_DATA.request
The MCPS_DATA.request() takes in these parameters:
 @ message_t *frame: The frame;
 @ uint8_t payloadLen: The length of the payload;
 @ uint8_t msduHandle: Msdu parameter;
 @ uint8_t txOptions: Transmission options
Now we see how this command is implemented.
1 // tkn154/DataP . nc
2 command ieee154_status_t MCPS_DATA. reques t (
3 message_t  frame ,
4 uint8_t payloadLen ,




9 uint8_t srcAddrMode = c a l l Frame . getSrcAddrMode ( frame ) ;
10 uint8_t dstAddrMode = c a l l Frame . getDstAddrMode ( frame ) ;
11 ieee154_address_t dstAddr ;
12 ieee154_status_t txStatus ;
13 ieee154_txframe_t txFrame ;
14 uint8_t sfType=0;
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15 uint8_t mhr ;
16 i f ( payloadLen > c a l l Packet . maxPayloadLength ( ) )
17 txStatus = IEEE154_INVALID_PARAMETER;
18 else i f ( ( ! srcAddrMode && ! dstAddrMode ) | |
19 ( srcAddrMode > ADDR_MODE_EXTENDED_ADDRESS | |
20 dstAddrMode > ADDR_MODE_EXTENDED_ADDRESS) | |
21 ( srcAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_RESERVED | |
22 dstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_RESERVED))
23 txStatus = IEEE154_INVALID_ADDRESS;
24 else i f ( ! ( txFrame = c a l l TxFramePool . get ( ) ) ) {
25 txStatus = IEEE154_TRANSACTION_OVERFLOW;
26 } else {
27 txFrame >header = &((message_header_t ) frame >header) >ieee154 ;
28 txFrame >payload = ( uint8_t ) frame >data ;
29 txFrame >metadata = &((message_metadata_t ) frame >metadata) >ieee154 ;
30 txFrame >payloadLen = payloadLen ;
31 mhr = txFrame >header >mhr ;
32 txFrame >headerLen = c a l l Frame . getHeaderLength ( frame ) ;
33 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] &= ~(FC1_FRAMETYPE_MASK | FC1_FRAME_PENDING | FC1_ACK_REQUEST) ;
34 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] |= FC1_FRAMETYPE_DATA;
35 i f ( txOptions & TX_OPTIONS_ACK)
36 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] |= FC1_ACK_REQUEST;
37 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] &= ~FC2_FRAME_VERSION_MASK;
38 i f ( payloadLen > IEEE154_aMaxMACSafePayloadSize )
39 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] |= FC2_FRAME_VERSION_1;
40 txFrame >handle = msduHandle ;
41 #i f d e f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
42 i f ( mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] & FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED)
43 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] |= FC2_FRAME_VERSION_1;
44 #end i f
45 c a l l Frame . getDstAddr ( frame , &dstAddr ) ;
46 i f ( dstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS){
47 i f ( dstAddr . shortAddress == c a l l MLME_GET. macCoordShortAddress ( ) )
48 sfType = INCOMING_SUPERFRAME;
49 else
50 sfType = OUTGOING_SUPERFRAME;
51 } else i f ( dstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_EXTENDED_ADDRESS){
52 i f ( dstAddr . extendedAddress == c a l l MLME_GET. macCoordExtendedAddress ( ) )
53 sfType = INCOMING_SUPERFRAME;
54 else
55 sfType = OUTGOING_SUPERFRAME;
56 } else i f ( dstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_NOT_PRESENT)
57 sfType = INCOMING_SUPERFRAME
58 i f ( txOptions & TX_OPTIONS_GTS){
59 i f ( sfType == INCOMING_SUPERFRAME)
60 txStatus = c a l l DeviceCfpTx . transmit ( txFrame ) ;
61 else
62 txStatus = c a l l CoordCfpTx . transmit ( txFrame ) ;
63 } else i f ( ( txOptions & TX_OPTIONS_INDIRECT) &&
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64 c a l l IsSendingBeacons . getNow ( ) &&
65 ( dstAddrMode >= ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS)){
66 i f ( dstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS &&
67 dstAddr . shortAddress == 0xFFFF){
68 mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] &= ~FC1_ACK_REQUEST;
69 txStatus = c a l l BroadcastTx . transmit ( txFrame ) ;
70 } else
71 txStatus = c a l l Ind i rectTx . transmit ( txFrame ) ;
72
73 } else {
74 i f ( sfType == INCOMING_SUPERFRAME)
75 txStatus = c a l l DeviceCapTx . transmit ( txFrame ) ;
76 else
77 txStatus = c a l l CoordCapTx . transmit ( txFrame ) ;
78 i f ( txStatus != IEEE154_SUCCESS){





After checking the correctness of the arguments (line 16 - 23), the transmission frame is built
(26 - 33); then AckPending and FrameVersion bits are set (lines 36 - 47). After that, in case a
node is both, coordinator and device, it has to be decided whether the frame is to be sent in the
incoming or outgoing superframe: it is done we do this by comparing the destination address to
the coordinator address in the PIB, if they match the frame is sent in the incoming sf otherwise
in the outgoing superframe (lines 49 - 61). Finally it is set Gts options (if enabled) and the
transmitting mode (direct or indirect) in lines 73 -84.
4.3 Sending and Receiving
4.3.1 Transmitting packets
Transmission process involves two steps: rstly is inserting the frame in transmission buer,
secondly is sending what is contained in it.
4.3.1.1 Load TXFIFO
Transmission buer is the register TXFIFO of CC2420. The TXFIFO is write only, but may be
read back using RAM. This register can be used with CC2420Fifo interface that oers the HAL
abstraction for accessing the FIFO registers of a ChipCon CC2420 radio. This interface provides
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a command that writes the FIFO and an event that signals the completion of a write operation.
async command cc2420_status_t write( ) is used to write byte in FIFOs.
async event void writeDone( ) is an event signaled when the write is nished.
 @ uint8_t* COUNT_NOK(length) data: pointer to data buer;
 @ uint8_t length: byte to write/written;
See now how this routine is implemented.
1 // chips /cc2420_tkn154/CC2420TransmitP
2 async command error_t CC2420Tx . loadTXFIFO( ieee154_txframe_t data )
3 {
4 atomic {
5 i f ( m_state != S_STARTED )
6 return FAIL ;
7 m_state = S_LOAD;
8 m_frame = data ;
9 m_frame >header >length = m_frame >headerLen + m_frame >payloadLen + 2 ; //2 for CRC
10 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
11 c a l l SFLUSHTX. s t robe ( ) ; // f l u s h out anything tha t was in TXFIFO
12 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
13 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;





19 async event void TXFIFO. writeDone ( uint8_t tx_buf , uint8_t tx_len , error_t e r r o r )
20 {
21 atomic {
22 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
23 i f ( tx_buf == &(m_frame >header >length ) ){
24 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
25 c a l l TXFIFO. wr i t e ( m_frame >header >mhr , m_frame >headerLen ) ;
26 return ;
27 } else i f ( tx_buf == m_frame >header >mhr) {
28 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;




33 m_state = S_READY_TX;
34 s i g n a l CC2420Tx . loadTXFIFODone(m_frame , e r r o r ) ;
35 }
Firstly, we must check if the radio is in the correct state; if so, it is switched in loading state.
Afterward the TXFIFO is ushed and the length of the frame is written in transmission buer(line
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14): the CRC is written by CC2420 that needs two more bytes in FIFO, so the frame we will write,
has to be two bytes longer (line 9). When we nished to write the length, and the writedone()
is signaled, we write the header (line 27) and in the next iteration the payload (line 31). Finally
the state changes in ready_to_transfer state and the end of operation is signaled.
4.3.1.2 Send
Loaded the TXFIFO, we choose the sending mode: we can use RadioTx.transmit(), transmit-
ting withouCCA, RadioTx.transmitUnslottedCsmaCa(), transmittig with a single CCA or Ra-
dioTx.transmitSlottedCsmaCa(). Chosen one of that, with all implications, send command can
be called.
1 // chips /cc2420_tkn154/CC2420TransmitP
2 async command error_t CC2420Tx . send ( bool cca ){
3 cc2420_status_t s ta tu s ;
4 bool conges t i on = TRUE;
5 atomic {
6 i f (m_state != S_READY_TX)
7 return EOFF;
8 #ifde f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
9 i f ( (m_frame >header >mhr [ 0 ] & FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED)? TRUE : FALSE & ( !ALREADY_CHIPERED)){
10 secur i tyCheck ( ) ;
11 }
12 #endif
13 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
14 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
15 s t a tu s = cca ? c a l l STXONCCA. s t robe ( ) : c a l l STXON. s t robe ( ) ;
16 i f ( ! ( s t a tu s & CC2420_STATUS_TX_ACTIVE ) ) {
17 s t a tu s = c a l l SNOP. s t robe ( ) ;
18 i f ( s t a tu s & CC2420_STATUS_TX_ACTIVE ) {
19 conges t i on = FALSE;
20 }
21 }
22 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
23 i f ( conges t i on )
24 return FAIL ;
25 else {
26 m_state = S_SFD;
27 #i f d e f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
28 ALREADY_CHIPERED = 0 ;
29 #end i f






If the radio is in the correct state (line 7), we look in the frame to see if it needs authentica-
tion/encryption (lines 11 - 13). We focus on this point in the next section. Then we eectively
send the packet with the strobe command and we read the status byte. If we have no errors, the
radio changes to the next state (line 34) and the ALREADY_CIPHERED bit is reset (it means
that the next packet, eventually, is not already ciphered) or we assume that the channel is busy
and we try to retransmit (if a encrypted packet has to be retransmit, we do not encrypt it again
because it is already encrypted).
4.3.2 Receiving packets
Receiving packets operation consists on reading the receiving buer RXFIFO of CC2420: it is
both writeable and readable. Writing to the RXFIFO should however only be done for debugging
or for using the RXFIFO for security operations (decryption/authentication). This register can
be used with CC2420Fifo interface that provides the following read routines:
async command cc2420_status_t beginRead( ) is used for reading from FIFOs.
async command error_t continueRead( ) is used for reading from FIFOs. without sending address
bytes.
async event void readDone() it is an event that signals the end of reading operation.
 @ uint8_t* COUNT_NOK(length) data : A pointer to the receive buer.
 @ uint8_t length : Length number of bytes read.
The beginRead() routine starts reading from the FIFO, continueRead() continues reading from
the FIFO without having to send the address byte again. Event readDone() will be signaled upon
completion of both routines. Now we see how they are implemented.
1 // chips /cc2420_tn154/CC2420ReceiveP
2 void r e c e i v e ( ) {
3 #ifde f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
4 header_pars ing_function ( ) ;
5 #endif
6 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
7 c a l l RXFIFO. beginRead ( &(( ieee154_header_t ) m_rxFramePtr >header) >length , 1 ) ;
8 }
Receive process starts with the receive(): rst operation that must be done, is understand if the
packet we will read in the buer, is secured or not. This is the job of header_parsing_function()
(line 5) that will be analyzed in the next section. So it can start reading from the RXFIFO: the
rst read tells us the length byte, then it is signaled the readDone().
1 async event void RXFIFO. readDone ( uint8_t rx_buf , uint8_t rx_len ,
2 error_t e r r o r ) {
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3 uint8_t buf ;
4 atomic {
5 buf = ( uint8_t ) &(( ieee154_header_t ) m_rxFramePtr >header) >length ;
6 rxFrameLength = ( ( ieee154_header_t ) m_rxFramePtr >header) >length ;
7 switch ( m_state ) {
8 case S_RX_LENGTH:
9 m_state = S_RX_FCF;
10 m_mhrLen2 = 0 ;
11 i f ( rxFrameLength + 1 > m_bytes_left ) {
12 // Length of t h i s packet i s b i gger than the RXFIFO, f l u s h i t out .
13 f l u s h ( ) ;
14 } else {
15 i f ( ! c a l l FIFO . get ( ) && ! c a l l FIFOP. get ( ) ) {
16 //m_bytes_left  = rxFrameLength + 1;
17 f l u s h ( ) ;
18 }
19
20 // i f ( rxFrameLength <= MAC_PACKET_SIZE) {
21 i f ( rxFrameLength <= ( s izeof ( ieee154_header_t )   1 + TOSH_DATA_LENGTH + 2)){
22 i f ( rxFrameLength > 0) {
23 i f ( rxFrameLength > SACK_HEADER_LENGTH) {
24 // This packet has an FCF byte p lus at l e a s t one more byte to read
25 c a l l RXFIFO. continueRead ( buf + 1 ,
26 SACK_HEADER_LENGTH) ;
27 break ;
28 } else {
29 // This i s r e a l l y a bad packet , sk ip FCF and get i t out of here .
30 f l u s h ( ) ;
31 //m_state = S_RX_PAYLOAD;
32 // c a l l RXFIFO. continueRead ( buf + 1 , rxFrameLength ) ;
33 }
34
35 } else {
36 // Length == 0; s t a r t reading the next packet
37 f l u s h ( ) ;
38 / atomic rece iv ingPacket = FALSE; /
39 / c a l l CSN. se t ( ) ; /
40 / c a l l SpiResource . r e l ea se ( ) ; /
41 / waitForNextPacket ( ) ; /
42 }
43
44 } else {
45 // Length i s too large ; we have to f l u s h the en t i r e Rx FIFO





51 i f ( c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength ( buf [ 1 ] , buf [ 2 ] , &m_mhrLen)
50
52 != SUCCESS | | m_mhrLen > rxFrameLength   2) {
53 // header s i z e incorrec t
54 f l u s h ( ) ;
55 break ;
56 } else i f (m_mhrLen > SACK_HEADER_LENGTH) {
57 m_state = S_RX_HEADER;
58 //Reading i f the frame i s secured
59 #i f d e f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
60 i f ( buf [ 1 ] & FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED) {
61 m_state = S_RX_SECURITY;
62 //<C.C.> I have to read one more byte to know how th t ASH in long .
63 c a l l RXFIFO. continueRead ( buf + 1 + SACK_HEADER_LENGTH,
64 m_mhrLen   SACK_HEADER_LENGTH +1);
65 break ;
66 }
67 #end i f
68 c a l l RXFIFO. continueRead ( buf + 1 + SACK_HEADER_LENGTH,
69 m_mhrLen   SACK_HEADER_LENGTH) ;
70 break ;
71 } else {
72
73 // complete header has been read : f a l l through
74 }
75 // f a l l through
76 case S_RX_HEADER:
77 // JH: we are e i t h e r using HW ACKs (normal rece ive mode) or don ' t ACK any
78 // packets ( promiscuous mode)
79 // Didn ' t f l i p CSn, we ' re ok to continue reading
80 i f ( ( rxFrameLength   (m_mhrLen+m_mhrLen2)   2) >
81 TOSH_DATA_LENGTH) // 2 for CRC
82 f l u s h ( ) ;
83 else {
84 m_state = S_RX_PAYLOAD;
85 c a l l RXFIFO. continueRead ( ( uint8_t ) m_rxFramePtr >data ,





91 i f ( c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getSecur i tyHeaderLength ( buf [ 1 ] ,
92 buf [m_mhrLen + 1 ] , &m_mhrLen2)!= SUCCESS | |
93 (m_mhrLen + m_mhrLen2) > rxFrameLength   2) {
94 // header s i z e incorrec t










104 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
105 i f ( ! m_missed_packets ) {
106 // Release the SPI only i f there are no more frames to download
107 c a l l SpiResource . r e l e a s e ( ) ;
108 }
109 i f ( m_timestamp_size ) {
110 i f ( rxFrameLength > 10 ) {
111 memcpy(&m_timestamp , &m_timestamp_queue [ m_timestamp_head ] ,
112 s izeof ( ieee154_reft ime_t ) ) ;
113 m_timestampValid = TRUE;




118 } else {
119 / metadata >time = 0 x f f f f ; /
120 m_timestampValid = FALSE;
121 }
122
123 // We may have rece ived an ack tha t should be processed by Transmit
124 // buf [ rxFrameLength ] >> 7 checks the CRC
125 i f ( ( m_rxFramePtr >data [ rxFrameLength   (m_mhrLen+m_mhrLen2)   1 ] >> 7 ) && rx_buf ) {
126 uint8_t type = ( ( ieee154_header_t ) m_rxFramePtr >header) >mhr [ 0 ] & 0x07 ;
127 / s i gna l CC2420Receive . rece ive ( type , m_p_rx_buf ) ; /
128 s i g n a l CC2420Receive . r e c e i v e ( type , m_rxFramePtr ) ;
129 / i f ( type == IEEE154_TYPE_DATA ) {/
130 i f ( ( type != IEEE154_TYPE_ACK | |
131 c a l l CC2420Config . isPromiscuousModeEnabled ( ) )
132 && !m_stop) {




137 waitForNextPacket ( ) ;
138 break ;
139 default :
140 atomic r e c e iv ingPacke t = FALSE;
141 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
142 c a l l SpiResource . r e l e a s e ( ) ;
143 i f (m_stop){








The rst iteration of the readDone() (lines 19 - 57), after consistency checks about frame length,
is reading Frame Control Fields and Sequence Number (3 bytes) of the MHR: they are read with
continueRead() at line 37; then, if the packet has the addressing elds (line 64) we have two
options: if Security Enabled ag is set, we will have to receive the the Auxiliary Security Header,
so we will read all addressing elds and the rst byte of Auxiliary Security Header(line 77); if
Security Enabled is not set, we will not have the Auxiliary Security Header, so we will read only
addressing elds. Assume that packet was ciphered, the next step is reading the security header
in S_RX_SECURITY state (line 109 - 126): we discover how long is the Auxiliary Security
Header (line 117) and read the same numbers of byte minus one from RXFIFO because the
Security Control Field has been already read. Finally (line 128 - 162) , we receive payload and,
if we receive an acknowledgment, the transmission process ends, if not, post receiveDone_task()
that complete the receiving procedure.
4.4 Security Procedures
4.4.1 Ciphering
Ciphering/authentication process is done by securitycheck() as we saw in the previous section.
This function sets all the parameters CC2420 needs to secure a packet recovering them from the
Auxiliary Security Header and the internal security structure or, in this case, statically.
1 // chips /CC2420_tkn154/CC2420TransmitP . nc
2 void secur i tyCheck ( ) {
3 uint8_t mode ; //Variable tha t descr i be cipher /auth mode
4 bool key ; // "Ram" pos i t i on of the Key
5 uint8_t micLength ; //Auth parameter
6 uint16_t cur r entSta tus ;
7 cc2420_status_t s ta tu s ;
8 uint8_t AddLen ; //Addressing f i e l d dimension
9 uint8_t SecLen ; // Secur i ty f i e l d dimension
10 uint8_t SecLevel = 0 ; // Secur i ty Control Fie ld
11 uint8_t start_CipAuth =0; //Posi t ion where Authenticat ion/Ciphering s t a r t
12 i f (SECURITYLOCK == 1){
13 post waitTask ( ) ;
14 } else {
15 //Wil l perform encryption lock r e g i s t e r s
16 atomic SECURITYLOCK = 1 ;
17 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength (m_frame >header >mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] ,
18 m_frame >header >mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] ,&AddLen ) ;
19 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getSecur ityHeaderLength (m_frame >header >mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] ,
20 m_frame >header >mhr [ AddLen ] , &SecLen ) ;
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21 SecLevel = (m_frame >header >mhr [ AddLen ] & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) ;
22 i f ( SecLevel == NO_SEC){
23 mode = CC2420_NO_SEC;
24 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
25 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CBC_MAC_4){
26 mode = CC2420_CBC_MAC;
27 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
28 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CBC_MAC_8){
29 mode = CC2420_CBC_MAC;
30 micLength = MICLENGTH8;
31 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CBC_MAC_16){
32 mode = CC2420_CBC_MAC;
33 micLength = MICLENGTH16;
34 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CTR){
35 mode = CC2420_CTR;
36 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
37 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CCM_4){
38 mode = CC2420_CCM;
39 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
40 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CCM_8){
41 mode = CC2420_CCM;
42 micLength = MICLENGTH8;
43 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CCM_16){
44 mode = CC2420_CCM;
45 micLength = MICLENGTH16;
46 } else {
47 //something i s wrong here
48 return ;
49 }
50 key = KEYREG0; // Using the KEYO RAM loca t ion for key
51 start_CipAuth = AddLen + SecLen ; //Payload Posi t ion
52 CTR_SECCTRL0 = ((mode << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_MODE) |
53 ( ( micLength 2)/2 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_M) |
54 ( key << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_TXKEYSEL) |
55 (1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_CBC_HEAD) ) ;
56 CTR_SECCTRL1 = ( start_CipAuth << CC2420_SECCTRL1_SEC_TXL) ;
57 //WRITE KEY0 REGISTER
58 c a l l CC2420Keys . setKey ( key , mykey ) ;
59 //WRITE TXNONCE REGISTER
60 nonce_bui lding_function (AddLen , micLength ) ;
61 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
62 c a l l TXNONCE. wr i t e (RAM_START, nonceValue , BITDIM16 ) ;
63 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
64 //WRITE SECCTRL0 REGISTER
65 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
66 c a l l SECCTRL0. wr i t e (CTR_SECCTRL0) ;
67 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
68 //WRITE SECCTRL1 REGISTER
69 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
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70 c a l l SECCTRL1. wr i t e (CTR_SECCTRL1) ;
71 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
72 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
73 s t a tu s = c a l l SNOP. s t robe ( ) ;
74 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
75 while ( s t a tu s & CC2420_STATUS_ENC_BUSY){
76 uwait (11024) ;
77 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
78 s t a tu s = c a l l SNOP. s t robe ( ) ;
79 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
80 }
81 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
82 c a l l STXENC. s t robe ( ) ;
83 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
84 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
85 c a l l SECCTRL0. read(&cur rentSta tus ) ;
86 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
87 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
88 c a l l SECCTRL0. wr i t e ( cur r entSta tus && ~(3 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_MODE) ) ;
89 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
90 atomic SECURITYLOCK = 0 ;
91 ALREADY_CHIPERED = 1 ;
92 }
93 }
The rst operation for setting security parameters is locking the registers: we wait until they
are idle (line 14). After recovering the Auxiliary Security Header position from the frame (lines
20 - 21, see Appendix A for utility functions code), working mode and micLength are set from
Security Control Field (lines 26 - 53). Then CTR_SECTRL0 is prepared for writing in SECC-
NTL0 register of CC2420 and in the same way SECCTRL1 (lines 75 - 83) : rst contains working
mode, key used, MIC length and other options; second the position where ciphering/authentica-
tion starts. (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5 in chapter 3.2.3 for detail). Afterwards CC2420Keys.setkey()
command puts the static key in the appropriate register (see Appendix A for details), and
nonce_building_function() (line 73) builds the nonce in according of CC2420 specication. If
the security module is idle (lines 90 - 100), we can encrypt/authenticate the frame in TXFIFO.
Finally, after clean up (lines 107 - 114), we unlock the registers and enabled the already_ciphered
ag: if the frame is not sent for any reason, it does not need another encryption/authentication.
When we send a encrypted frame, receiver is slower because it has more bytes to read (authenti-
cation) or it has to performs deciphering(encryption). So sender has to wait a little longer that
receiver sends an acknowledgment to it. This can be done with the following code:
1 // chips /cc2420_tkn154/CC2420TransmitP
2 #ifde f IEEE154_SECURITY_ENABLED
3 i f ( (m_frame >header >mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] & FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED))
4 c a l l BackoffAlarm . s t a r t ( 2 0 0 ) ;
5 else
6 c a l l BackoffAlarm . s t a r t ( 1 0 0 ) ;
7 #else




Deciphering/authentication is performed in two steps: initially we access the RAM to discover if
the received packet is secured and so the real decipher procedure.
1 // chips /cc2420_tkn154/CC2420ReceiveP .
2 void header_pars ing_function ( )
3 {
4 uint8_t temp = 0 ;
5 ieee154_header_t header ;
6 atomic pos = ( packetLength + pos ) % RXFIFO_SIZE ;
7 i f ( pos + (LENDIM + FCDIM) > RXFIFO_SIZE){
8 temp = RXFIFO_SIZE   pos ;
9 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
10 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header , temp ) ;
11 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
12 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
13 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read (RAM_START, ( uint8_t)&header+temp ,
14 (LENDIM + FCDIM) temp ) ;
15 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
16 } else {
17 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
18 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header , LENDIM + FCDIM ) ;
19 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
20 }
21 i f ( header .mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] & FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED ) {
22 dec ( ) ;
23 return ;
24 } else {




Header_parsing_function() accesses to the RAM and reads how the packet is long and Frame
Control Field. Dimension of packet is important because RAM is a circular buer, so we have
to know the replenish status of the RAM and the oset of the next packet; Frame Control Field
tells us if the Security Enabled bit is set: in that case, dec() is called and deciphering operation
is started.
1 // chips /cc240_tkn154/CC2420ReceiveP . nc
2 void dec ( ){
3 uint8_t key =0 ,mode = 0 ;
4 uint8_t AddLen = 0 ; //Addressing f i e l d dimension
5 uint8_t SecLen = 0 ; // Secur i ty f i e l d dimension
6 uint8_t SecLevel = 0 ; // Secur i ty Control Fie ld
7 uint8_t start_CipAuth =0; //Posi t ion where Authenticat ion/Ciphering s t a r t
8 uint8_t temp = 0 ;
9 ieee154_header_t header ;
10 cc2420_status_t s ta tu s ;
11 ieee154_address_t  srcAddress = NULL;
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12 i f (SECURITYLOCK == 1){
13 post waitTask ( ) ;
14 return ;
15 } else {
16 atomic SECURITYLOCK = 1 ;
17 i f ( pos + (LENDIM + FCDIM) > RXFIFO_SIZE){
18 temp = RXFIFO_SIZE   pos ;
19 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
20 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header , temp ) ;
21 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
22 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
23 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read (RAM_START, ( uint8_t)&header+temp ,
24 (LENDIM + FCDIM) temp ) ;
25 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
26 } else {
27 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
28 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header ,
29 LENDIM + FCDIM ) ;
30 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
31 }
32 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength ( header .mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] ,
33 header .mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC2] ,&AddLen ) ;
34 // NOW I read FROM THE START to the f i r s t byte of Auxi l iary Secur i ty Header
35 i f ( pos + ( AddLen + LENDIM + FCDIM) > RXFIFO_SIZE){
36 temp = RXFIFO_SIZE   pos ;
37 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
38 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header , temp ) ;
39 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
40 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
41 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read (RAM_START, ( uint8_t)&header+temp ,
42 ( AddLen + LENDIM + FCDIM)  temp ) ;
43 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
44 } else {
45 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
46 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header , ( AddLen + LENDIM + FCDIM) ) ;
47 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
48 }
49 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . getSecur ityHeaderLength ( header .mhr [MHR_INDEX_FC1] ,
50 header .mhr [ AddLen ] , &SecLen ) ;
51 //Now i read a l l un t i l the end of Auxi l iary Secur i ty Header
52 i f ( pos + ( AddLen + LENDIM + FCDIM + SecLen ) > RXFIFO_SIZE){
53 temp = RXFIFO_SIZE   pos ;
54 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
55 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header , temp ) ;
56 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
57 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
58 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read (RAM_START, ( uint8_t)&header+temp ,
59 ( AddLen + LENDIM + FCDIM +SecLen )  temp ) ;
60 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
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61 } else {
62 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
63 atomic c a l l RXFIFO_RAM. read ( pos , ( uint8_t)&header ,
64 ( AddLen + LENDIM + FCDIM + SecLen ) ) ;
65 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
66 }
67 SecLevel = ( header .mhr [ AddLen ] & SEC_CNTL_LEVEL) ;
68 i f ( SecLevel == NO_SEC){
69 mode = CC2420_NO_SEC;
70 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
71 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CBC_MAC_4){
72 mode = CC2420_CBC_MAC;
73 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
74 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CBC_MAC_8){
75 mode = CC2420_CBC_MAC;
76 micLength = MICLENGTH8;
77 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CBC_MAC_16){
78 mode = CC2420_CBC_MAC;
79 micLength = MICLENGTH16;
80 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CTR){
81 mode = CC2420_CTR;
82 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
83 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CCM_4){
84 mode = CC2420_CCM;
85 micLength = MICLENGTH4;
86 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CCM_8){
87 mode = CC2420_CCM;
88 micLength = MICLENGTH8;
89 } else i f ( SecLeve l == CCM_16){
90 mode = CC2420_CCM;
91 micLength = MICLENGTH16;
92 } else {
93 //something i s wrong here
94 return ;
95 }
96 key = KEYREG0; // Using the KEYO RAM loca t ion for key
97 start_CipAuth = AddLen + SecLen ;
98 key = KEYREG0; //Posi t ion of the Key
99 c a l l CC2420Keys . setKey ( key , mykey ) ;
100 i f ( SecLevel == CBC_MAC_4 | | SecLevel == CBC_MAC_8 | | SecLevel == CBC_MAC_16){
101 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= (micLength  2 ) / 2 << CBCMAC_NONCE_FLAGS;
102 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 1 << CBCADATA_NONCE_FLAGS;
103 }
104 else {
105 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 0 << CBCMAC_NONCE_FLAGS;
106 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 0 << CBCADATA_NONCE_FLAGS;
107 }
108  ( ( nxle_uint64_t ) (&(nonceValue [SOURCE_CLIENT_NONCE] ) ) ) =
109 srcAddress >extendedAddress ;
58
110 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 2 << L_NONCE_FLAGS;
111 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE] = header .mhr [ AddLen + 1 ] ;
112 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE + 1 ] = header .mhr [ AddLen + 2 ] ;
113 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE + 2 ] = header .mhr [ AddLen + 3 ] ;
114 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE + 3 ] = header .mhr [ AddLen + 4 ] ;
115 nonceValue [KSC_NONCE] = SecLeve l ;
116 nonceValue [BLOCK_COUNTER_NONCE] = 0 ;
117 nonceValue [BLOCK_COUNTER_NONCE + 1 ] = 1 ;
118 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
119 atomic c a l l RXNONCE. wr i t e (RAM_START, nonceValue , BITDIM16 ) ;
120 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
121 i f (mode == CC2420_CBC_MAC | | mode == CC2420_CCM){
122
123 CTR_SECCTRL0 = ((mode << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_MODE) |
124 ( ( micLength 2)/2 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_M) |
125 ( key << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_RXKEYSEL) |
126 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_CBC_HEAD) |
127 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_RXFIFO_PROTECTION)) ;
128 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
129 atomic c a l l SECCTRL0. wr i t e (CTR_SECCTRL0) ;
130 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
131 } else i f (mode == CC2420_CTR )
132 {
133
134 CTR_SECCTRL0 = ((mode << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_MODE) |
135 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_M) |
136 ( key << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_RXKEYSEL) |
137 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_CBC_HEAD) |
138 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_RXFIFO_PROTECTION)) ;
139 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
140 atomic c a l l SECCTRL0. wr i t e (CTR_SECCTRL0) ;
141 c a l l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
142 }
143
144 CTR_SECCTRL1 = ( start_CipAuth << CC2420_SECCTRL1_SEC_RXL) ;
145 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
146 atomic c a l l SECCTRL1. wr i t e (CTR_SECCTRL1) ;
147 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
148 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
149 atomic c a l l SRXDEC. s t robe ( ) ;
150 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
151 packetLength = header . l ength + 1 ;
152 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
153 s t a tu s = c a l l SNOP. s t robe ( ) ;
154 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
155 while ( s t a tu s & CC2420_STATUS_ENC_BUSY){
156 uwait (11024) ;
157 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
158 s t a tu s = c a l l SNOP. s t robe ( ) ;
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159 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
160 }
161 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
162 atomic c a l l SECCTRL0. wr i t e ( (RESET_BIT0 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_MODE) |
163 (RESET_BIT0 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_M) |
164 (RESET_BIT0 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_RXKEYSEL) |
165 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_SEC_CBC_HEAD) |
166 (RESET_BIT1 << CC2420_SECCTRL0_RXFIFO_PROTECTION)) ;
167 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;





Dec() is very similar as securitycheck():after locking the registers (lines 16 - 19), we read the
security information with RAM access (lines 23 - 83); we set working mode (lines 86 - 111),
decryption key (line 120), nonce ( lines 121 - 144) and security control registers (lines 147 - 179).
Finally SRXDEC.strobe( ) performs decryption and, when security module is idle, SECCTRL0
is cleaned.
4.5 Test Application
Our scenario is made by two motes: a RFD that sends ciphered packets and a FFD that receives
ciphered packets and deciphers them; RFD sends one packet for beacon received. Working mode
is CTR because it is the easiest to verify and the key is static. In gure 4.6 can we see a
simplication the communication paradigm.
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Figure 4.6: Data Exchange
4.5.1 Sender Application
This is the sender application.
1 #include "TKN154 . h"
2 #include " app_prof i l e . h"




7 i n t e r f a c e Boot ;
8 i n t e r f a c e MCPS_DATA;
9 i n t e r f a c e MLME_RESET;
10 i n t e r f a c e MLME_SET;
11 i n t e r f a c e MLME_GET;
12 i n t e r f a c e MLME_SCAN;
13 i n t e r f a c e MLME_SYNC;
14 i n t e r f a c e MLME_BEACON_NOTIFY;
15 i n t e r f a c e MLME_SYNC_LOSS;
16 i n t e r f a c e IEEE154Frame as Frame ;
17 i n t e r f a c e IEEE154BeaconFrame as BeaconFrame ;
18 i n t e r f a c e Leds ;
19 i n t e r f a c e Packet ;
20 }
21 } implementation {
22
23 message_t m_frame ;
24 uint8_t m_payloadLen ;
25 uint8_t myVar ;
26 ieee154_secur i ty_t mysec ;
27 ieee154_PANDescriptor_t m_PANDescriptor ;
28 bool m_ledCount ;
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29 bool m_isPANDescriptorValid ;
30 bool m_sending ;
31 uint8_t u = 0 ;
32 uint8_t d = 0 ;
33
34
35 void startApp ( ) ;
36 task void packetSendTask ( ) ;
37
38 event void Boot . booted ( ) {
39 char payload [ ] = "00 Packet sent  from Device " ;
40
41
42 uint8_t payloadRegion ;
43 m_payloadLen = s t r l e n ( payload ) ;
44 payloadRegion = c a l l Packet . getPayload(&m_frame , m_payloadLen ) ;
45 i f (m_payloadLen <= c a l l Packet . maxPayloadLength ( ) ) {
46 memcpy( payloadRegion , payload , m_payloadLen ) ;




51 event void MLME_RESET. conf irm ( ieee154_status_t s t a tu s )
52 {
53 i f ( s t a tu s == IEEE154_SUCCESS)
54 startApp ( ) ;
55 }
56
57 void startApp ( )
58 {
59 ieee154_phyChannelsSupported_t channelMask ;
60 uint8_t scanDuration = BEACON_ORDER;
61
62 m_isPANDescriptorValid = FALSE;
63 c a l l MLME_SET. macShortAddress (TOS_NODE_ID) ;
64 channelMask = ( ( uint32_t ) 1) << RADIO_CHANNEL;
65 c a l l MLME_SET. macAutoRequest (FALSE) ;
66 mysec . Secu r i tyLeve l=CTR;
67 mysec . KeyIdMode = 0 ;
68 c a l l MLME_SCAN. reques t (
69 PASSIVE_SCAN, // ScanType
70 channelMask , // ScanChannels
71 scanDuration , // ScanDuration
72 0x00 , // ChannelPage
73 0 , // EnergyDetectListNumEntries
74 NULL, // EnergyDetectList
75 0 , // PANDescriptorListNumEntries
76 NULL, // PANDescriptorList






82 event message_t MLME_BEACON_NOTIFY. i nd i c a t i o n (message_t frame )
83 {
84
85 ieee154_phyCurrentPage_t page = c a l l MLME_GET. phyCurrentPage ( ) ;
86 ieee154_macBSN_t beaconSequenceNumber = c a l l BeaconFrame . getBSN( frame ) ;
87 i f ( beaconSequenceNumber & 1)
88 c a l l Leds . led2On ( ) ;
89 else
90 c a l l Leds . l ed2Of f ( ) ;
91 i f ( ! m_isPANDescriptorValid && c a l l BeaconFrame . parsePANDescriptor (
92 frame , RADIO_CHANNEL, page , &m_PANDescriptor ) == SUCCESS){
93 i f (m_PANDescriptor . CoordAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS &&
94 m_PANDescriptor . CoordPANId == PAN_ID &&
95 m_PANDescriptor . CoordAddress . shortAddress == COORDINATOR_ADDRESS){





101 return frame ;
102 }
103
104 event void MLME_SCAN. conf irm (
105 ieee154_status_t status ,
106 uint8_t ScanType ,
107 uint8_t ChannelPage ,
108 uint32_t UnscannedChannels ,
109 uint8_t EnergyDetectListNumEntries ,
110 int8_t EnergyDetectList ,





116 i f ( m_isPANDescriptorValid ){
117
118
119 c a l l MLME_SET. macCoordShortAddress (m_PANDescriptor . CoordAddress . shortAddress ) ;
120 c a l l MLME_SET.macPANId(m_PANDescriptor . CoordPANId ) ;
121 c a l l MLME_SYNC. reques t (m_PANDescriptor . LogicalChannel ,
122 m_PANDescriptor . ChannelPage , FALSE) ;
123 c a l l Frame . s e tAddre s s i ngF i e ld s (
124 &m_frame ,
125 ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS, // SrcAddrMode ,
126 ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS, // DstAddrMode ,
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127 m_PANDescriptor . CoordPANId , // DstPANId ,
128 &m_PANDescriptor . CoordAddress , // DstAddr ,
129 &mysec // secur i t y
130 ) ;
131 post packetSendTask ( ) ;
132 } else {




137 task void packetSendTask ( )
138 {
139 i f ( u + 1 > 9) {
140 m_frame . data [ 1 ] =' 0 ' ;
141 u = 0 ;
142 i f ( d + 1 > 9) {
143 m_frame . data [ 0 ] = ' 0 ' ;
144 d = 0 ;
145 } else {
146 m_frame . data [0]++;
147 d++;}
148 } else {





154 p r i n t f ( "My payload sent   %s\n" , ( char) m_frame >data ) ;
155 p r i n t f f l u s h ( ) ;
156 i f ( ! m_sending && m_isPANDescriptorValid &&
157 c a l l MCPS_DATA. reques t (
158 &m_frame , // frame ,
159 m_payloadLen , // payloadLength ,
160 0 , // msduHandle ,
161 TX_OPTIONS_ACK // TxOptions ,
162 ) == IEEE154_SUCCESS)





168 event void MCPS_DATA. conf i rm (
169 message_t msg ,
170 uint8_t msduHandle ,




175 m_sending = FALSE;
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176 i f ( s t a tu s == IEEE154_SUCCESS ){
177 c a l l Leds . led1Toggle ( ) ;
178 }
179 post packetSendTask ( ) ;
180 }
181
182 event void MLME_SYNC_LOSS. i nd i c a t i o n (
183 ieee154_status_t lossReason ,
184 uint16_t PANId ,
185 uint8_t LogicalChannel ,
186 uint8_t ChannelPage ,
187 ieee154_secur i ty_t  s e c u r i t y )
188 {
189
190 startApp ( ) ;
191 }
192
193 event message_t MCPS_DATA. i nd i c a t i o n (message_t frame )
194 {
195 // we don ' t expect data




The sender, after theMLME_RESET.conrm(), hears the channel with theMLME_SCAN.request()
to understand if there are any coordinators. Then when it discovers a beacon, set the parameters
in the frame and calls the MCPS_DATA.request(). Then when it receives acknowledgment, the
MCPS_DATA.conrm(), toggles also the green led and ends the sending process.
4.5.2 Receiver application
The receiver application is very similar.
1 #include "TKN154 . h"
2 #include " app_prof i l e . h"




7 i n t e r f a c e Boot ;
8 i n t e r f a c e MCPS_DATA;
9 i n t e r f a c e MLME_RESET;
10 i n t e r f a c e MLME_START;
11 i n t e r f a c e MLME_SET;
12 i n t e r f a c e MLME_GET;
13 i n t e r f a c e IEEE154Frame as Frame ;
14 i n t e r f a c e IEEE154TxBeaconPayload ;
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15 i n t e r f a c e Leds ;
16 }
17 } implementation {
18
19 bool m_ledCount ;
20 char mypayload [ 5 0 ] ;
21
22 event void Boot . booted ( ) {
23 c a l l MLME_RESET. reques t (TRUE, BEACON_ENABLED_PAN) ;
24 }
25
26 event void MLME_RESET. conf irm ( ieee154_status_t s t a tu s )
27 {
28 i f ( s t a tu s != IEEE154_SUCCESS)
29 return ;
30 c a l l MLME_SET. macShortAddress (COORDINATOR_ADDRESS) ;
31 c a l l MLME_SET. macAssociat ionPermit (FALSE) ;
32 c a l l MLME_START. reques t (
33 PAN_ID, // PANId
34 RADIO_CHANNEL, // LogicalChannel
35 0 , // ChannelPage ,
36 0 , // StartTime ,
37 BEACON_ORDER, // BeaconOrder
38 SUPERFRAME_ORDER, // SuperframeOrder
39 TRUE, // PANCoordinator
40 FALSE, // BatteryLi feExtension
41 FALSE, // CoordRealignment
42 0 , // CoordRealignSecurity ,




47 event message_t MCPS_DATA. i nd i c a t i o n ( message_t frame )
48 {
49 uint8_t tempo=0;
50 uint8_t l en = ( ( ieee154_header_t ) frame >header) >length & FRAMECTL_LENGTH_MASK;
51 c a l l Leds . l ed1Toggle ( ) ;
52 for ( tempo = 0 ; tempo < len ; tempo++)
53 mypayload [ tempo ] = (char ) frame >data [ tempo ] ;
54 p r i n t f ( "My payload r e c e i v ed :  %s\n" , mypayload ) ;
55 p r i n t f f l u s h ( ) ;
56
57 for ( tempo = 0 ; tempo < 50 ; tempo ++)
58 mypayload [ tempo ] = 0 ;
59
60




64 event void MLME_START. conf i rm ( ieee154_status_t s ta tu s ) {}
65
66 event void MCPS_DATA. conf i rm (
67 message_t msg ,
68 uint8_t msduHandle ,







76 event void IEEE154TxBeaconPayload . aboutToTransmit ( ) { }
77
78 event void IEEE154TxBeaconPayload . setBeaconPayloadDone (void beaconPayload , uint8_t length ) { }
79
80 event void IEEE154TxBeaconPayload . modifyBeaconPayloadDone (
81 uint8_t o f f s e t , void  buf f e r , uint8_t buf fe rLength ) { }
82
83 event void IEEE154TxBeaconPayload . beaconTransmitted ( )
84 {
85 ieee154_macBSN_t beaconSequenceNumber = c a l l MLME_GET.macBSN ( ) ;
86
87
88 i f ( beaconSequenceNumber & 1)
89 c a l l Leds . led2On ( ) ;
90 else
91 c a l l Leds . l ed2Of f ( ) ;
92 }
93 }
After MLME_reset(), the coordinator starts to send beacons and listens for incoming trans-
mission. When it nds an incoming frame, starts the receiving procedure and, at the very end,
the MCPS_data.indication() is signaled and the application prints the payload of the frame the
coordinator receives.
4.5.3 Results
In the gures 4.7 and 4.8 we can see the output of the sender and of the receiver: the payload has a
dynamic part, the initial progressive counter that is incremented before singleMCPS_data.request()
command on the sender, and a xed part, the remain portion of the payload. Like we see in the
picture, with a little delay, the payload that the senders sends to the coordinator, arrives on they
receiver and the were correctly deciphered.
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Figure 4.7: Sender Output




This thesis work started considering IEEE 802.15.4 standard, that describes a radio communi-
cation protocol for wireless Personal Area Networks. It also provides a security suite by means
of which is possible to create encrypted packets, authenticated packets and encrypted and au-
thenticated packets. This functionalities can be integrated with the capabilities of the CC2420
chipset over TelosB motes.The chipset supports the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and features also a
set of options to provide the in-line security operations planned by IEEE 802.15.4. The TelosB
motes is IEEE 802.15.4 compliant and supports the TinyOs environment and NesC language.
The objective of this work was to create a secure communication between two motes. How-
ever, some simplications were made during the development process: the communication occurs
between a single sender that sends packets to a single coordinator, having care to not overload
the network. In addition, the security parameters are statically set (there is not any key retrieval
procedure) and only the encryption mode (CTR) was implemented and tested.
The implementation was veried by means of a simple application: the sender transmits an
encrypted data frame each time a beacon frame has been received, while the coordinator receives
packets, decrypts them and sends acknowledgments to conrm that the packet was correctly
received. As shown by the application output, the payload of transmitted and received packets
always coincides, proving that encryption/decryption operations work properly.
Further improvements can be added as future work: CBC-MAC and CCM mode can be easily
implemented. Besides, full incoming/outgoing frame security procedures can be implemented
as well, with incoming/outgoing frame key retrieval procedures, in order to cope with frame






 Provided by: Frame
 Implemented where: tkn154/PibP.nc
 Purpose: writing Auxiliary Security Field when message_t *frame parameter is not avail-
able.
 uint8_t* mhr: Pointer to MAC Header.
 uint8_t start: Starting oset of Auxiliary Security Header.
 ieee154_security_t *security: Security values.
1 // tkn154/PibP . nc
2 command error_t Frame . writeSecurityMHR ( uint8_t mhr ,
3 uint8_t s ta r t ,
4 i eee154_secur i ty_t  s e c u r i t y )
5 {
6 ieee154_macFrameCounter_t macCounter ;
7 i eee154_secur i ty_t temp = s e cu r i t y ;
8 uint8_t o f f s e t = s t a r t ;
9 i f ( temp  > Secur i tyLeve l > 7 | | temp  > KeyIdMode > 4)
10 return FAIL ; //wrong va lues
11 mhr [ o f f s e t ] = ( temp > Secur i tyLeve l << SEC_CNTL_LEVEL_POS) ;
12 mhr [ o f f s e t ] |= 0 << SEC_CNTL_RESERVED_POS;
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13 mhr [ o f f s e t++] |= ( temp  >KeyIdMode << SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE_POS) ;
14 macCounter = c a l l MLME_GET. macFrameCounter ( ) ;
15 i f ( macCounter >= 0 x f f f f f f f f )
16 return IEEE154_COUNTER_ERROR;
17  ( ( nx_uint8_t ) (&(mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) ) ) = macCounter ;
18 o f f s e t += 4 ;
19 c a l l MLME_SET. macFrameCounter(++macCounter ) ;
20 i f ( temp >KeyIdMode & SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE ) {
21 i f ( ( temp >KeyIdMode & SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE) == KEYIDMODE1) {
22 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeyIndex ;
23 }
24 else i f ( ( temp >Secur i tyLeve l & SEC_CNTL_KEYIDMODE) == KEYIDMODE2) {
25 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 0 ] ;
26 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 1 ] ;
27 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 2 ] ;
28 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 3 ] ;
29 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeyIndex ;
30 }
31 else {
32 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 0 ] ;
33 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 1 ] ;
34 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 2 ] ;
35 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 3 ] ;
36 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 4 ] ;
37 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 5 ] ;
38 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 6 ] ;
39 mhr [ o f f s e t++] = temp >KeySource [ 7 ] ;






The commands setCbcMac() and setCCM(), provided by CC2420SecurityMode interface, have




 Provided by: FrameUtility
 Implemented where: tkn154/PibP.nc
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 Purpose: writing Addressing Fields of Header.
 uint8_t* mhr: Pointer to MHR.
 uint8_t DstAddrMode: Destination Addressing Mode.
 uint8_t DstPANId: Destination PAN Identier.
 ieee154_address_t* DstAddr: Destination IEEE extended address.
 uint8_t SrcAddrMode: Source Addressing Mode.
 uint8_t SrcPANId: Source PAN Identier.
 const ieee154_address_t* SrcAddr: Source IEEE extended address.
 bool PANIdCompression: PAN Id compression ag
1 // tkn154/PibP . nc
2 async command uint8_t FrameUti l i ty . writeHeader (
3 uint8_t mhr ,
4 uint8_t DstAddrMode ,
5 uint16_t DstPANId ,
6 ieee154_address_t DstAddr ,
7 uint8_t SrcAddrMode ,
8 uint16_t SrcPANId ,




13 uint8_t o f f s e t = MHR_INDEX_ADDRESS;
14 i f (DstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS | | DstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_EXTENDED_ADDRESS){
15  ( ( nxle_uint16_t ) &mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) = DstPANId ;
16 o f f s e t += 2 ;
17 i f (DstAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS){
18  ( ( nxle_uint16_t ) &mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) = DstAddr >shortAddress ;
19 o f f s e t += 2 ;
20 } else {
21 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . convertToLE(&mhr [ o f f s e t ] , &DstAddr >extendedAddress ) ;
22 o f f s e t += 8 ;
23 }
24 }
25 i f ( SrcAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS | | SrcAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_EXTENDED_ADDRESS){
26 i f (DstPANId != SrcPANId | | ! PANIDCompression ){
27  ( ( nxle_uint16_t ) &mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) = SrcPANId ;
28 o f f s e t += 2 ;
29 }
30 i f ( SrcAddrMode == ADDR_MODE_SHORT_ADDRESS){
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31  ( ( nxle_uint16_t ) &mhr [ o f f s e t ] ) = SrcAddr >shortAddress ;
32 o f f s e t += 2 ;
33 } else {
34 c a l l FrameUti l i ty . convertToLE(&mhr [ o f f s e t ] , &SrcAddr >extendedAddress ) ;
35 o f f s e t += 8 ;
36 }
37 }




 Provided by: FrameUtility
 Implemented where: tkn154/PibP.nc
 Purpose: Count how long is Addressing Fileds
 uint8_t fcf1: First Byte of Frame Control Field.
 uint8_t fcf2: Second Byte of Frame Control Field.
 uint8_t *len: Length of Header (except of Auxiliary Security Header, if present)
1 // tkn154/PibP . nc
2 async command error_t FrameUti l i ty . getAddress ingFie ldsLength ( uint8_t f c f 1 ,
3 uint8_t f c f 2 , uint8_t  l en )
4 {
5 uint8_t idCompression ;
6 uint8_t o f f s e t = MHR_INDEX_ADDRESS;
7 idCompression = ( f c f 1 & FC1_PAN_ID_COMPRESSION) ;
8 i f ( f c f 2 & 0x08 ){
9 o f f s e t += 4 ;
10 i f ( f c f 2 & 0x04 )
11 o f f s e t += 6 ;
12 }
13 i f ( f c f 2 & 0x80 ){
14 o f f s e t += 2 ;
15 i f ( ! idCompression )
16 o f f s e t += 2 ;
17 i f ( f c f 2 & 0x40 )
18 o f f s e t += 6 ;
19 }





 Provided by: FrameUtility
 Implemented where: tkn154/PibP.nc
 Purpose: Count how long is Auxiliary Security Header
 uint8_t fcf1: First Byte of Frame Control Field.
 uint8_t SecurityControl: SecurityControl Field.
 uint8_t *len: Length of Auxiliary Security Header.
1 // tkn154/PibP . nc
2 async command error_t FrameUti l i ty . getSecur ityHeaderLength ( uint8_t f c f 1 ,
3 uint8_t Secur i tyContro l , uint8_t  l en )
4 {
5 uint8_t o f f s e t =0;
6 i f ( f c f 1 & FC1_SECURITY_ENABLED) {
7 o f f s e t +=5;
8 i f ( Secur i tyContro l & AUX_KEYID) {
9 i f ( ( Secur i tyContro l & AUX_KEYID) == AUX_KEYID1) {
10 o f f s e t +=1;
11 }
12 else i f ( ( Secur i tyContro l & AUX_KEYID) == AUX_KEYID2) {
13 o f f s e t +=5;
14 }
15 else {









 Provided by: 
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 Implemented where: chips/cc2420_tkn154/CC2420TransmitP
 Purpose: Fill the TXNONCE with correct values.
 uint8_t stat: Oset where Auxiliary Security Header start.
 uint8_t Auth: Authentication option.
1 // chips /cc2420\_tkn154/CC2420TransmitP
2 void nonce_bui lding_function ( uint8_t s ta r t , uint8_t auth )
3 {
4 uint8_t SecLevel = m_frame >header >mhr [ s t a r t ] ;
5 ieee154_address_t srcAddress ;
6 i f ( SecLevel == CBC_MAC_4 | | SecLevel == CBC_MAC_8 | | SecLevel == CBC_MAC_16){
7 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= auth << CBCMAC_NONCE_FLAGS;
8 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 1 << CBCADATA_NONCE_FLAGS;
9 }
10 else {
11 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 0 << CBCMAC_NONCE_FLAGS;
12 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 0 << CBCADATA_NONCE_FLAGS;
13 }
14 srcAddress . extendedAddress = c a l l GetLocalExtendedAddress . get ( ) ;
15  ( ( nxle_uint64_t ) (&(nonceValue [SOURCE_CLIENT_NONCE]) ) )= srcAddress . extendedAddress ;
16 nonceValue [FLAGS_NONCE] |= 2 << L_NONCE_FLAGS;
17 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE] = m_frame >header >mhr [ s t a r t + 1 ] ;
18 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE + 1 ] = m_frame >header >mhr [ s t a r t + 2 ] ;
19 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE + 2 ] = m_frame >header >mhr [ s t a r t + 3 ] ;
20 nonceValue [COUNTER_NONCE + 3 ] = m_frame >header >mhr [ s t a r t + 4 ] ;
21 nonceValue [KSC_NONCE] = SecLeve l ;
22 nonceValue [BLOCK_COUNTER_NONCE] = 0 ;
23 nonceValue [BLOCK_COUNTER_NONCE + 1 ] = 1 ;
24 }
A.6 setKey
 Provided by: CC2420Keys
 Implemented where: chips/cc2420_tkn154/CC2420ControlP
 Purpose: Set the Key in one Key Register of CC2420
 uint8_t keyNo: Index of the register
 uint8_t* key: Key.
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1 // chips /cc2420\_tkn154/CC2420ControlP
2 async command error_t CC2420Keys . setKey ( uint8_t keyNo , uint8_t key )
3 {
4 uint8_t  currentKey = key ;
5 bool currentKeyNo = keyNo ;
6 i f ( currentKey == NULL | | keyNo > 1) {
7 return FAIL ;
8 }
9 i f ( currentKeyNo ) {
10 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
11 c a l l KEY1. wr i t e (0 , currentKey , 1 6 ) ;
12 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
13 } else {
14 c a l l CSN. c l r ( ) ;
15 c a l l KEY0. wr i t e (0 , currentKey , 1 6 ) ;
16 c a l l CSN. s e t ( ) ;
17 }







1 // tkn154/TKN154. h
2 #define MAX_MAC_KEY_TABLE_ENTRIES 16
3 #define MAX_MAC_DEVICE_TABLE_ENTRIES 16
4 #define MAX_MAC_SECURITY_LEVEL_TABLE_ENTRIES 16
5 #define MAX_MAC_KEY_ID_LOOKUP_LIST_ENTRIES 16
6 #define MAX_MAC_DEVICE_LIST_ENTRIES 16
7 #define MAX_MAC_KEY_USAGE_LIST_ENTRIES 16
8 #define MAX_DEVICE_TABLE_ENTRIES 16
9 #define MAX_MAC_SECURITY_TABLE_ENTRIES 16
10 #define MAX_OCTETS 8
11
12 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macKeyTableEntries_t ;
13 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macDeviceTableEntries_t ;
14 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macSecur ityLevelTableEntr ies_t ;
15 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macAutoRequestSecurityLevel_t ;
16 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macAutoRequestKeyIdMode_t ;
17 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macAutoRequestKeyIndex_t ;
18 typedef uint64_t ieee154_macPANCoordExtendedAddress_t ;
19 typedef uint16_t ieee154_macPANCoordShortAddress_t ;
20 typedef uint8_t ieee154_KeyIdLookupListEntries_t ;
21 typedef uint8_t ieee154_KeyDeviceListEntr ies_t ;
22 typedef uint8_t ieee154_KeyUsageListEntries_t ;
23 typedef uint16_t ieee154_Key_t ;
24 typedef uint8_t ieee154_FrameType_t ;
25 typedef uint8_t ieee154_CommandFrameIdentifier_t ;
26 typedef uint8_t ieee154_DeviceDescr iptorHandle_t ;
27 typedef bool ieee154_UniqueDevice_t ;
28 typedef bool i eee154_Black l i s t ed_t ;
29 typedef uint8_t ieee154_SecurityMinimum_t ;
77
30 typedef uint8_t ieee154_DeviceOverrideSecurityMinimum_t ;
31 typedef uint64_t ieee154_ExtAddress_t ;
32 typedef bool ieee154_Exempt_t ;
33 typedef uint8_t ieee154_LookUpDataSize_t ;
34 typedef uint8_t ieee154_LookUpData_t ;
35 typedef uint32_ ieee154_macFrameCounter_t ;
36 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macAutoRequestKeySource_t ;
37 typedef uint8_t ieee154_macDefaultKeySource_t ;
38
39 typedef struct ieee154_KeyUsageDescriptor_t {
40 ieee154_FrameType_t  frametype ;
41 ieee154_CommandFrameIdentifier_t commandframeident i f ier ;
42 } ieee154_KeyUsageDescriptor_t ;
43
44 typedef struct ieee154_KeyIdLookupDescriptor_t {
45 ieee154_LookUpDataSize_t lookupdatas i z e ;
46 ieee154_LookUpData_t lookupdata ;
47 } ieee154_KeyIdLookupDescriptor_t ;
48
49 typedef struct ieee154_KeyDeviceDescriptor_t {
50 uint8_t dev i c ed e s c r i p t o rhand l e ;
51 ieee154_UniqueDevice_t uniquedev ice ;
52 i eee154_Black l i s t ed_t b lackL i s t ed ;
53 } ieee154_KeyDeviceDescriptor_t ;
54
55 typedef struct ieee154_KeyDescriptor_t {
56 ieee154_KeyIdLookupDescriptor_t key id l ookupde s c r i p to r
57 [MAX_MAC_KEY_ID_LOOKUP_LIST_ENTRIES] ;
58 ieee154_KeyDeviceDescriptor_t k e y d e v i c e l i s t [MAX_MAC_DEVICE_LIST_ENTRIES] ;
59 ieee154_KeyUsageDescriptor_t k eyu s a g e l i s t [MAX_MAC_KEY_USAGE_LIST_ENTRIES] ;
60 ieee154_Key_t key ;
61 } ieee154_KeyDescriptor_t ;
62
63 typedef struct ieee154_macKeyTable_t {
64 ieee154_KeyDescriptor_t keyde s c r i p t o r [MAX_MAC_KEY_TABLE_ENTRIES] ;
65 bool va l i d [MAX_MAC_KEY_TABLE_ENTRIES] ;
66 } ieee154_macKeyTable_t ;
67
68 typedef struct {
69 ieee154_macPANId_t panid ;
70 ieee154_address_t address ;
71 ieee154_macFrameCounter_t framecounter ;
72 bool Exempt ;
73 } ieee154_DeviceDescr iptor_t ;
74
75 typedef struct {
76 ieee154_DeviceDescr iptor_t d ev i c e d e s c r i p t o r [MAX_MAC_DEVICE_TABLE_ENTRIES] ;
77 bool va l i d [MAX_MAC_DEVICE_TABLE_ENTRIES] ;
78 } ieee154_macDeviceTable_t ;
78
79
80 typedef struct {
81 ieee154_FrameType_t frametype ;
82 ieee154_CommandFrameIdentifier_t commandframeident i f ier ;
83 ieee154_SecurityMinimum_t securityminimum ;
84 ieee154_DeviceOverrideSecurityMinimum_t d ev i c e o v e r r i d e s e c u r i t y ;
85 } ieee154_Secur i tyDescr iptor_t ;
86
87 typedef struct {
88 ieee154_Secur i tyDescr iptor_t s e c u r i t y d e s c r i p t o r [MAX_MAC_SECURITY_TABLE_ENTRIES] ;
89 bool va l i d [MAX_MAC_SECURITY_TABLE_ENTRIES] ;
90 } ieee154_macSecurityLevelTable_t ;
1 // tkn154/TKN154_MAC. h
2 IEEE154_macKeyTable = 0x71 ,
3 IEEE154_macKeyTableEntries = 0x72 ,
4 IEEE154_macDeviceTable = 0x73 ,
5 IEEE154_macDeviceTableEntries = 0x74 ,
6 IEEE154_macSecurityLevelTable = 0x75 ,
7 IEEE154_macSecurityLevelTableEntries = 0x76 ,
8 IEEE154_macFrameCounter = 0x77 ,
9 IEEE154_macAutoRequestSecurityLevel = 0x78 ,
10 IEEE154_macAutoRequestKeyIdMode = 0x79 ,
11 IEEE154_macAutoRequestKeySource = 0x7a ,
12 IEEE154_macAutoRequestKeyIndex = 0x7b ,
13 IEEE154_macDefaultKeySource = 0x7c ,
14 IEEE154_macPANCoordExtendedAddress = 0x7d ,
15 IEEE154_macPANCoordShortAddress = 0x7e ,
1 // tkn154/TKN154_PIB. h
2 ieee154_macKeyTable_t macKeyTable ;
3 //0x72
4 ieee154_macKeyTableEntries_t macKeyTableEntries ;
5 //0x73
6 ieee154_macDeviceTable_t macDeviceTable ;
7 //0x74
8 ieee154_macDeviceTableEntries_t macDeviceTableEntries ;
9 //0x75
10 ieee154_macSecurityLevelTable_t macSecurityLevelTable ;
11 //0x76
12 ieee154_macSecur ityLevelTableEntr ies_t macSecur i tyLeve lTableEntr ie s ;
13 //0x77
14 ieee154_macFrameCounter_t macFrameCounter ;
15 //0X78
16 ieee154_macAutoRequestSecurityLevel_t macAutoRequestSecurityLevel ;
17 //0x79
18 ieee154_macAutoRequestKeyIdMode_t macAutoRequestKeyIdMode ;
19 //0x7a
20 ieee154_macAutoRequestKeySource_t macAutoRequestKeySource [ 8 ] ;
79
21 //0x7b
22 ieee154_macAutoRequestKeyIndex_t macAutoRequestKeyIndex ;
23 //0x7c
24 ieee154_macDefaultKeySource_t macDefaultKeySource [ 8 ] ;
25 //0x7d
26 ieee154_macPANCoordExtendedAddress_t macPANCoordExtendedAddress ;
27 //0x7e
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